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Jason Scott Johnstonf
In the economic analysis of law, famous cases are often famous not so
much because of how courts have actually interpreted and applied them, but
because they suggest potentially efficient legal rules. In this way, the rule of
a famous case comes to represent a particular set of efficiency arguments, and
these arguments become as foundational to the economic analysis of law as are
the cases to doctrine. But economic explanations of doctrinal efficiency are
themselves grounded in certain, assumptions and conventions. Indeed, one of
the valuable things about the economic approach to law is its straightforward
statement of the assumptions from which analysis proceeds.1 To treat a particu-
lar efficiency argument as an established "rule" is therefore to treat argument
as myth and to lose what is perhaps most valuable about the economic ap-
proach: the potential to progressively enrich our understanding of legal rules
and institutions by examining their efficiency under progressively more realistic,
if more complex, behavioral and environmental assumptions.
This Article attempts to further the progressive research program of law and
economics by questioning the established economic analysis of one of the
foundational contract law cases, Hadley v. Baxendale.2 By limiting the extent
of promissory liability for consequential damages to those which are "foresee-
able, ' 3 Hadley exemplifies a "default" contract rule: an implicit term of a
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contract unless the contracting parties explicitly agree to vary it.4 Because
Hadley represents a default rule on contractual liability, the economic analysis
of Hadley is an analysis of both a particular legal rule-the foreseeability
limitation on consequential loss liability-and a general rule of contract con-
struction-the implied default term. Here, I draw on insights about strategic
bargaining from contemporary game theory to argue against the grain of the
established understanding of both the Hadley foreseeability test and default
rules generally. In so doing, I hope to expand the economic understanding of
default rules, and, at the same time, to contribute to the nascent relationship
between law and game theory.5
In the established economic understanding, Hadley illustrates a "penalty"
default rule: a rule which "forces" the revelation of information which the
revealing party might generally wish not to reveal.6 In the Hadley situation,
the default rule is taken7 to provide only limited promisor liability for promisee
consequential loss. This rule penalizes a promisee who will suffer high conse-
quential loss-such as large lost profits-by denying her recovery of much of
her loss. Faced with the prospect of large uncompensated damages in the event
of breach, the promisee will have an incentive to tell the promisor that she will
suffer large lost profits. The promisor may then agree to be liable for the full
extent of such a promisee's loss, but only if the promisee agrees to pay a higher
price for the contract. The promisee and society must be better off with such
a rule, because the information which the promisee is "forced" to reveal allows
the promisor to take the optimal, fully informed level of precaution against
breach.
For some years, my intuition has been that this story fails to account for
strategic incentives in bargaining. Again, according to the established view a
promisee who will suffer loss of exceptionally large profits if the promisor
breaches is supposed to tell the promisor that performance is especially impor-
tant and valuable, and then agree to some price increase in exchange for the
promisor's agreement to accept liability for these exceptional losses. But if we
4. On the idea of default rules in contract law, see generally Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J 87 (1989); Craswell, Contract Law
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Goetz & Scott, The Limits
of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CALIF. L. REv. 261 (1985).
5. The recently published book, E. RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO
GAME THEORY (1989), promises to make the central concepts in game theory accessible for the first time
to a fairly wide legal audience. It seems likely that game theory will play an increasingly important role
in legal analysis, see Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 101 (1990) (reviewing E.
RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION), but there are, as yet, few articles in law journals which take this
approach. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4; Mnookin & Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market
Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295 (1989); Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989).
6. The term "penalty" default was coined by Ayres & Gertoer, supra note 4.
7. I say "taken" because the economic understanding of the rule in Hadley is not the same as the rule
in Hadley as it has come to be interpreted and applied by courts.
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are talking about bargaining over the contract, then we are talking about a
process of strategic information transmission, a process in which the promisee
tries to persuade the promisor that she cannot pay a high price, and the promi-
sor tries to persuade the promisee that she should. In this process, the promisee
would generally want to convince the promisor that her value from performance
is low-that is, that she will not make especially large profits from successful
performance. And the promisor would want to persuade the promisee--especial-
ly one who will not be fully covered against all consequential loss-thatperfor-
mance is virtually a sure thing, so that the contract is very valuable to the
promisee, and also that performance is very costly, so that the promisee must
pay a relatively high price or else the promisor will walk away.
But then the general strategic incentives in this bargaining situation are
directly at odds with the established information-forcing justification for the
rule in Hadley: the promisee is supposed to reveal her crucial item of private
information-her value from performance-and thus do what is generally
completely contrary to her strategic interest in the bargaining game. The
promisee is, moreover, supposed to do this even though there is no incentive
for the promisor to reveal his key item of private information-the actual
probability of breach. Generally, the higher the initial probability of breach
under the limited liability default rule, the more the promisee benefits from
getting the promisor to agree to increase his liability above this default. So
bargaining around the Hadley default is more likely, the higher the promisee's
estimation of the probability of breach under this default. But then we have a
final strategic problem with bargaining around the Hadley default: to get the
contract in the first place, the promisor generally wants to persuade the
promisee that the breach probability is low. So to bargain around this default,
the promisor must convey information which is generally directly contrary to
his strategic interest in bargaining with the default. Put somewhat more simply,
the promisor wants a profitable contract, but risks not getting any contract at
all by seeking to extract a high price from the promisee in exchange for
insuring the promisee against losses above what the default provides. Thus, the
promisor will not have an interest in bargaining around the default.
At virtually every stage in this story, strategic incentives in bargaining seem
to cut against the idea that the penalty default rule in Hadley can force
promisees to reveal information. The story shows, moreover, how the estab-
lished understanding neglects entirely the promisor's incentive to reveal infor-
mation. But just as Hadley qua case stands as a fixed point in the common law,
so too does Hadley as theory stand as a pillar in the economic analysis of
contract law. How can it be that Hadley as a theory about bargaining around
the law is so at odds with my simple intuitive story?
My goal in the remainder of this Article is to answer this question. The
answer has, I think, at least two, related parts. First, existing formal (mathemati-
cal) economic models of the rule in Hadley have simply not been formulated
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to capture the kind of strategic incentives which my story identifies. The models
therefore are actually special and correspond poorly to what the nontechnical
person imagines when he thinks of "bargaining" around the law. Second,
because, as I mentioned earlier, Hadley represents a general type of legal
rule-the default rule-the validity of the established understanding of Hadley
has tended to follow from the more general, established economic understanding
of default rules. This general understanding-which I call the "Coasean Con-
tractual Theory"--rests on an enormously powerful and influential insight, the
Coase Theorem.8 But this insight and the theory constructed upon it also fail
to account for strategic incentives, and instead simply assume that there is no
impediment to bargaining other than direct transaction costs.
In Part I of this Article, I explain in detail how the absence of explicit
consideration of bargaining incentives limits both the specific established
understanding of Hadley and the general Coasean Contractual Theory. In Part
II, I sketch some stylized stories depicting the strategic difficulties that are
likely to arise when parties try to bargain around an information-forcing or
penalty default such as the Hadley rule. My goal in Part II is to persuade the
reader that even in admittedly simple models, strategic bargaining consider-
ations tend to favor what I call "expansive" default rules, such as the "foresee-
ability" limitation which Hadley has actually become. I do not claim to have
presented a general theory, and indeed I think that a truly general treatment of
the bargaining problem in Hadley in fact would require more modeling horse-
power than the game theoretic analysis of bargaining has yet developed.' Still,
my series of vignettes argues that expansive default rules often eliminate
strategic impediments to bargaining around the default.
Having made these points about bargaining incentives, it remains possible
that I will have said little about the actual efficiency of expansive default rules,
for it may be that even though it is easy to bargain around such rules, almost
everyone prefers the "penalty" default. That is, it may be that the Hadley rule
really is no penalty at all, but rather simply what the majority would have
contracted for anyway. By imposing an expansive default, we would then
simply force people to incur needless transaction costs in bargaining around
the law. Professor Richard Epstein has in fact recently mounted just this sort
8. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
9. The intuitive story about Hadley which I have told above describes a sequential bargaining game
with two-sided private information and correlated or dependent values. As I note in Part I.B, while there
have been some very recent approaches to the one-sided correlated values problem, none of these deal with
games involving mutually correlated private information. That is, this is a very difficult, and to the best of
my knowledge unsolved, type of problem. For an analysis of auctions with mutually payoff-relevant
information, see Cremer & McLean, Optimal Selling Strategies Under Uncertainty for a Discriminating
Monopolist When Demands are Interdependent, 53 ECONOMETICA 345 (1985); for an analysis of transfer
schemes, see Johnson, Pratt & Zeckhauser, Efficiency DespiteMutually Payoff-RelevantPrivate Information:
The Finite Case, 58 ECONOMEMRICA 873 (1990).
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of empirical attack on expansive default rules,1" and empirical observations
about the terms contained in "most" contracts of a given class are more gener-
ally an important part of the Coasean approach to default terms.1
In Part III of this Article, I meet the empiricist challenge to my theoretical
results. I argue that an extensive (although admittedly incomplete and method-
ologically informal) survey of hundreds of cases on consequential damages over
the last 120 years (which includes a period when Hadley was more stringently
interpreted than it now is, as under Holmes' tacit agreement view) 2 finds few
cases where the promisee claimed to have done what the information-forcing
theory says she should have done: nobody seems to have claimed that they told
the promisor that they would suffer unusually large consequential damages. At
the same time, there are scores of recent cases in which the parties apparently
accepted the more expansive "foreseeability" version of Hadley. I do not
contend that any of this constitutes conclusive empirical proof that most people
like the "foreseeability" limitation and that those who do not are able to bargain
around it. Rather, I contend merely that there is no conclusive evidence one
way or the other. And I make the general point, made also by Ayres and
Gertner," that just as people sometimes fail to bargain around a default rule
not because the default is efficient for them but because there are strategic
impediments to bargaining around it, the observation that lots of people bargain
around a default rule does not imply that the rule they bargain to is the optimal
default rule. It may be that the bargained-to rule would, for strategic reasons,
not be bargained around were it the default rule.
Part III also points out the trouble the information-forcing theory of Hadley
has in harmonizing Hadley with other, related contract doctrines such as the
nondisclosure rule in Laidlaw v. Organ4 and the law's reluctance to enforce
liquidated damage provisions. 5 The law's reluctance to enforce liquidated
damage provisions makes it very difficult for bargainers to do the very thing
that the information-forcing theory says they should do. Laidlaw's accepted
meaning within the economic analysis of law (which it must be stressed is, like
Hadley's meaning, quite different than its meaning as actual contract doctrine)
that it is undesirable to force the revelation of at least some kinds of informa-
tion is also problematic for the information-forcing theory. Both of these related
doctrines, however, are consistent with my theory.
Finally, in Part IV, I conclude with some limited remarks on the problems
of positivism in the economic analysis of law that are raised by Hadley and
10. EpsteinBeyondForeseeability: ConsequentialDamages intheLaw ofContract, 181. LEGAL STUD.
105 (1989).
11. See infra note 33.
12. See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
13. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4.
14. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
15. See generally E. FARNSWOInH, CONTRACrs, § 12.18, at 895-904 (1982).
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Hadley's place in the larger attempt to "explain" the common law from an
economic point of view.
I. THE EFFICIENCY OF HADLEY
In Hadley, a gristmiller contracted to have a carrier transport the broken
crankshaft of the steam engine which drove the mill to be duplicated and
replaced. Delivery was delayed by several days, during which time the mill
could not operate, and the miller sued for lost profits during the period of delay.
On appeal, the miller was denied recovery for lost profits as consequential
damages. The court held that consequential loss was recoverable only if it was
"such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach
of it."'' 6 Apparently the court in Hadley decided that lost profits were not "in
the contemplation of both parties" as a consequence of breach because normally
the miller would have had a spare on hand or perhaps been shut down for other
reasons in any event.' 7
The holding in Hadley clearly had the potential to become a very restrictive
rule, under which, in Justice Holmes' interpretation, "the extent of liabili-
ty... should be worked out on terms which it may fairly be presumed (the
defendant) would have assented to if they had been presented to his mind."18
Instead, the test which Hadley apparently rejected 9 has become the general
rule: the defendant who breaches is liable for all losses that he had "reason to
foresee as a probable result of the breach when the contract was made." 20 The
defendant need not have tacitly assumed liability to that extent. All that matters
is that he had knowledge which would make such losses foreseeable.2'
A. Hadley and the Information-Forcing Paradigm
As Judge Posner casts it, Hadley stands for the principle "that if a risk of
loss is known to only one party to the contract, the other party is not liable for
the loss if it occurs." He explains this principle as inducing the party with
knowledge of the risk either to take precaution or reveal the risk to the other
party and pay him to assume it. Posner recognizes that it is at best misleading
to call this general principle a foreseeability limitation, since even though one
party knows what his specific loss will be, the other knows at least that such
16. 9 Ex. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151. This discussion of the facts and holding in Hadley is drawn
from E. FARNSWORM, supra note 15, at 873-74 (1982).
17. See id.
18. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 543 (1903).
19. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 122-24.
20. R STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1980).
21. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 15, at 875; Epstein, supra note 10, at 124-25.
22. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 114-15 (3d ed. 1986).
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a loss might occur, even though his information as to its size is not as good.
Posner thus analogizes this principle to the tort law "avoidability" limitation.a
The principle applies, according to Posner, to consequential damages other than
lost profits. 4
The basic notion that Hadley is efficient because it forces the revelation of
private information regarding consequential loss and thereby facilitates optimal
precautions against breach is now the established economic understanding. I
will refer to this as the "information-forcing" theory or paradigm. 5 This
understanding has recently been clarified and formalized by Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner,'s and by Lucien Bebchuk and Steven Shavell.2 7 These papers
find conditions under which only an avoidability limitation is consistent with
efficiency, because information revelation will not occur if this limitation is
withdrawn. It is important to understand both the intuition and the assumptions
23. Posner prefers to state the Hadley principle in terms of the promisee's ability to avoid the
consequences of breach, so that rather than forcing information to be revealed, the Hadley limitation on
the recovery of consequential loss forces the promisee to take precautions against breach. If the promisee
is indeed the cheapest cost avoider, then this would be the efficient result, and the Hadley limitation would
not present the strategic problems with which I am concerned. Of course, Posner does not really argue that
the typical case is one in which the promisee knows that he is the cheapest cost avoider. His general defense
of the Hadley principle is that it "induces the party with knowledge of the risk either to take appropriate
precautions himself, or, if he believes that the other party might be the more efficient preventer or spreader
(insurer) of the loss, to reveal the risk to that party and pay him to assume it." Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
This is a nifty bit of rhetoric: Posner wants the reader to think of the principle as an avoidability principle
because this label suggests the only case in which the principle is clearly efficient.
24. Posner says that the rule of Hadley is not applied where what is unforeseeable is the other
party's lost profit on the deal. Id. at 115. He explains that:
[A]ny other rule would make it difficult for a good bargainer to collect damages unless before
the contract was signed he had made disclosures that would reduce the advantage of being a
good bargainer-disclosures that would prevent the [promisee] from appropriating the gains
from his efforts to identify a resource that was undervalued in its present use. This is just the
application of Laidlaw v. Organ in a damage setting.
Id. In this passage, Posner recognizes the sort of strategic problem that I focus on here, but he does not
provide any reason for thinking that the problem is present only in cases where the consequential loss is
the direct lost profit on the deal.
25. This idea appears not only in Judge Posner's treatise, but in a number of other important discussions
of the efficiency of contract damages rules. See, e.g., R. COOTER & T. ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoICs 427-28
(1988); Barton, The Economic Basis ofDamagesfor Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277, 296 (1972);
Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 241 (1983);
Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
39 (1981). The idea permeates even more traditional, doctrinal discussions of Hadley. See, e.g., CONTRACT
LAW TODAY: ANGLO-FRENCH COMPAMISONs 292 (D. Harris & D. Tallon eds. 1989) (Hadley principle
provides an "incentive for parties to exchange information at the time of negotiating the contract and hence
to allocate risks .... [A] party who wishes protection for special losses... may have to pay an increased
price for the promisor to assume the additional burden."). And, largely through Judge Posner's opinions,
this is becoming the explicit judicial rationale for applying the Hadley principle in a wide variety of settings.
See, e.g., Rardin v. T&D Mach. Handling, Inc., 890 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1989); Afram Export Corp. v.
Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1985); EVRA Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951
(7th Cir. 1982).
26. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4. This Article deals with a number of other issues raised by what
I call below the Coasean Contractual Theory, but its central section, entitled "A General Theory of De-
fault Choice," focuses on the Hadley scenario.
27. L. Bebchuck & S. Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract
(unpublished manuscript available at Harvard Law School, April 1989).
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that underlie these results, because my analysis, which develops the opposite
intuition, follows from varying the assumptions made by Ayres and Gertner and
by Bebchuck and Shavell.
In the initial, default situation under an avoidability limitation, cost minimiz-
ing carriers in our Hadley example (and promisors more generally) will take
a level of precautions against breach which is efficient, given that their liability
is limited to typical items of consequential loss that are known to both the
carrier and the shipper. If this is all that the carrier knows-that he may be
liable for consequential damages up to this limit-then the carrier will take
precautions that are optimal given expected liability under that ceiling. These
precautions will be too low for some shippers (those with atypically large
losses) and too high for others (those with atypically small losses). There are
therefore gains to be realized from trade in what is, after all, a private good,
i.e., the shipper's knowledge of her actual consequential loss.
Both the shipper and carrier can benefit if the shipper reveals the magnitude
of her loss. If a low loss shipper reveals that she is a low loss type by, say,
requesting a low liquidated consequential damage contract, then the carrier will
take fewer precautions than in the initial, default situation, but also charge a
lower price. Such a contract makes a low loss shipper better off, because she
does not need higher precautions to be taken. Conversely, if a high loss shipper
reveals that she is a high loss type and requests a high liquidated consequential
damage contract, then the carrier will take more precautions, but also charge
a higher price. There clearly exist prices at which a high loss shipper is better
off with this contract, however, because when the carrier is liable for higher
damages he takes precautions which are closer to the optimal level of precau-
tions against a risk of high loss.
This is the story under a Hadley-type limitation. It is an elaboration of
Posner's information-forcing paradigm. Most significant about the recent work
by Ayres and Gertner and by Bebchuck and Shavell, however, is the next step
in the analysis-the demonstration that information will not be revealed if we
begin with a legal default rule of relatively unlimited liability, such as the
foreseeability rule. To see why, consider the initial position of a high loss
shipper under an expansive default liability rule. This shipper is fully covered
against her loss. The probability of breach and consequential loss are in fact
too high for this shipper, because the carrier bases his precautions on the
average or expected loss under the expansive default, which is by definition
less than that suffered by the high loss shipper. But there is no reason for the
shipper to care about the probability of loss if she is fully covered against loss.
Hence, the shipper has no incentive either to propose or to agree to a deviation
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from the status quo of unlimited liability. The high loss shipper's private
information is left untraded. s
The same reasoning, however, implies that the low loss shipper should have
an incentive to tell the carrier that she does not want the high-price expansive
liability contract. The low value shipper would propose or accept a contract
with limited liability and a lower price.
Neither Ayres and Gertner nor Bebchuck and Shavell deny this. They
recognize the incentive that low value shippers have to bargain around the
expansive liability default rule, but make formal (i.e., mathematical) assump-
tions about the relative probabilities of low and high value shippers which make
it unlikely that society will be best off under the expansive liability default.
Ayres and Gertner argue that as the probability that any given shipper will
suffer high consequential losses goes to zero, low value shippers will lose any
incentive to bargain around the expansive liability default, no matter how small
the transaction cost involved may be, because the contract is converging to what
is optimal for such a shipper. But this just says that if there is only one kind
of shipper, who suffers low loss, then an expansive liability contract is essen-
tially identical to a limited liability contract, so there is nothing to gain by
bargaining around an expansive liability default.29 Conversely, a high value
shipper will realize a fixed gain by bargaining around a default which provides
only for low carrier liability, because the contract's liability coverage does not
depend on the relative proportion of low and high value shippers.
Somewhat similarly but more simply, Bebchuck and Shavell argue that if
low value shippers outnumber high value shippers, and positive transaction
costs are incurred in bargaining around the default, then transaction costs will
be lower if the default calls for limited liability and forces high value shippers
to bargain than if it calls for expansive liability and forces low value shippers
to bargain.30
B. Hadley and Coasean Contractual Theory
The central contribution made by Ayres and Gertner is not their analysis
of the Hadley information-forcing theory (which, as I noted above, has been
the accepted view for several years), but rather the recognition that this theory
may significantly qualify what I shall call the "Coasean Contractual Theory."
This qualification calls attention to the importance of strategic incentives in
bargaining around initial or "default" legal rules. To see why these strategic
28. Both the shipper and carrier benefit if a high value shipper reveals this fact, however, and thus if
such a revelation could be verified, the carrier might actually offer a discount to a high value shipper who
revealed this fact and thereby allowed the carrier to take optimal precautions. Below, I note that liquidated
damage doctrine can perhaps be looked at as an attempt to provide such verification and thereby promote
such beneficial exchanges of information.
29. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 110-11.
30. L. Bebchuck & S. Shavell, supra note 27.
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incentives are important to the Coasean Theory, a brief summary of that theory
is in order.
Coase's Theorem maintains that under certain assumptions, including the
assumption of zero transaction costs, initial legal rules or entitle-
ments---"default" rules-are irrelevant to the attainment of efficient outcomes
through private bargaining.3 1 The Coasean Contractual Theory is built upon
an immediate corollary obtained by relaxing Coase's assumption of zero
transaction costs. The corollary has two parts: first, if the gains from bargaining
around the status quo entitlements fixed by the law fail to exceed the cost of
bargaining, then the initial entitlement is also the final entitlement; second, if
transaction costs are positive but less than the gain from bargaining to a new
allocation, then the initial entitlement still matters because it determines who
will bargain and at what cost. When individuals have differing preferences, the
Coase Theorem has been taken to prescribe the selection of an initial entitle-
ment which is efficient for "most" bargainers, since this is the entitlement
which will minimize transaction costs.32 A common complementary final step
in the Coasean analysis is to observe what most bargainers agree upon and set
the initial or status quo entitlement at that point.33
This all presumes, of course, that individuals are free to bargain around the
legal rule-that the legal rule merely supplements other terms of the parties'
agreement and does not mandate that a particular term be included. Indeed,
Coasean contractual analysis is inconsistent with mandatory legal rules, since
if the gains from contracting around a legal rule outweigh the transaction costs
of doing so, then such a move is efficient and ought to be allowed. Rather than
mandating a final outcome, the law on this view merely adopts a standard (or
default) term which parties are free to alter.34
Taken within the context of this larger theory, what Judge Posner calls the
Hadley avoidability limitation superficially seems to be a Coasean solution. If
the parties do nothing to alter the default outcome under Hadley, then the
measure of consequential damages in their contract will be that which is
appropriate in the typical or average transaction. Hadley may thus be viewed
31. Coase, supra note 8. Coase's hypothesis has largely been supported in experimental tests. See, e.g.,
Hoffman & Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982). But see
Donohue, Diverting the Coasean River: Incentive Schemes to Reduce Unemployment Spells, 99 YALE L.L
549 (1989); Schwab, A Coasean Experiment on Contract Presumptions, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 237 (1988).
32. For a lucid statement of this theory, see M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS
11-14 (2d ed. 1989).
33. I discuss the validity of this empirical inference at greater length. See infra, at Part BI.B. Authors
applying the Coasean Theory to analyze the corporate law as a standard form contract rely particularly
heavily on this empirical inference. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation ofInsider Trading, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 857 (1983) (arguing that failure to find corporate charters outlawing insider trading suggests such
trading is efficient).
34. On mandatory versus suppletory contract terms, compare Coffee, TheMandatory/Enabling Balance
in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 118 (1989) and Gordon, The
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1549 (1989) with Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLuM. L. REV. 1416 (1989).
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as supplying the rule which most parties would want, and which therefore
minimizes the transaction costs incurred by those who bargain around the rule.
As Ayres and Gertner have pointed out, however, the standard Coasean
theory does not explain Hadley, and this shows that the prescription to mini-
mize transaction costs by choosing as the default that rule which "most" parties
would want is not always enough to generate efficient outcomes. What the
standard Coasean prescription generally neglects is precisely what Posner, Ayres
and Gertner, and Bebchuck and Shavell stress is Hadley's efficiency: its impact
in creating incentives for information revelation through bargaining.35 If
Hadley does not create these incentives-if a high loss promisee fails to
disclose her private information about loss to the promisor-then the promisor
cannot take optimal precautions against breach, and a limitation may create
large inefficiencies. Thus, as a general matter, it is not always enough to ask
what most parties would want and then to set the initial legal default rule at
this point. The selection of a default rule necessarily determines the strategic
incentive to bargain around the default, because the default dictates what kind
of private information will be revealed in bargaining around it. The standard
prescription for choosing default rules must be qualified to take into account
the fact that information is revealed in bargaining around the default."
Ayres and Gertner make a major contribution in recognizing how the
general problem of information revelation, a problem which is of central
importance in contemporary game theory,37 applies to the selection of a con-
tract default rule. However, the Ayres and Gertner conclusion-that if informa-
tion revelation concerns argue for something other than the standard choose-
what-most-parties-want Coasean prescription, then those concerns argue in favor
of information-forcing default rules such as the restrictive Hadley avoidability
default-is strongly dependent upon special underlying assumptions. These
assumptions limit the generality of their results, so that those results say little
about the effect of strategic bargaining in general. In particular, like Bebchuck
and Shavell, Ayres and Gertner assume that carriers in the Hadley story are
identical price-taking firms. This means that a carrier is interested in learning
35. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 91.
36. Id. at 94. The information revelation phenomenon may operate somewhat differently in the context
of relational contracts defining corporations, partnerships, and marriages as opposed to the one-shot, discrete
transaction I consider in this Article. For a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach to information
revelation and implied contractual terms in cooperative ventures, see 3. Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out:
Bargaining for Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures (unpublished manuscript available at Vanderbilt
Law School, Sept. 1990). For an interesting attempt to explain and justify commercial default rules as the
product of limited judicial competence and norms of social cooperation, see Scott, A Relational Theory of
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 1. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
37. For some illustrations which show how information revelation cuts across many contemporary
approaches to incentive problems, see E. Maskin & J. Tirole, Principals with Private Information I (Indepen-
dent Values) and 1I (Dependent Values) (Harvard Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers Nos.
1234 & 1412) (principal-agent framework); Myerson, Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal, 51
ECONOMETRICA 1767 (1983) (mechanism design); Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite & Suzumura, Strategic
Information Revelation, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 25 (1990) (extensive form games with sequential equilibria).
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what the shipper's actual damages from breach will be not in order to compute
his most profitable price, but only in order to take the appropriate level of
precautions against breach. And there is nothing for the shipper to learn about
the carrier, since all carriers are identical.
This is a far cry from what is colloquially called "bargaining."38 In the
carrier-shipper example, we might more naturally think of bargaining as
involving a series of assertions, bluffs, offers, and counteroffers, as the carrier
tries to figure out exactly how much he can charge the shipper without losing
the deal, and the shipper attempts to get an idea of how reliable the carrier is
and how much it really costs her to deliver on time. When Ayres and Gertner
say that information revelation issues argue for "penalty" or information-forcing
default rules, therefore, they are making a statement about information revela-
tion issues in the austere world of my previous paragraph, not this strategically
richer, more intuitive story of haggling and rent seeking.
II. STRATEGIC INFORMATION REVELATION AND THE CHOICE OF DEFAULT
RULE
My goal in this Part is to use the stylized shipper-carrier bilateral bargaining
problem presented by Hadley to develop some general points about information
revelation in bargaining around the law. I will begin with a very simple model,
and successively add to the model's complexity. In this way, the complexity
of the information revelation problem-its sensitivity to the kinds of assump-
tions one makes about the underlying bargaining process-will become appar-
ent. This progression through alternative theoretical scenarios will also show
that the strategic incentives in bargaining around a default rule of limited
liability often go the "wrong" way-that is, they discourage such bargain-
ing-whereas incentives in bargaining around an expansive default rule usually
go the right way.
Before beginning the story-telling, however, two clarifications are necessary.
The first is terminological and conceptual: I will refer throughout this part to
two types of default rules in the Hadley situation, "limited" and "unlimited"
liability rules. By "unlimited," I mean (and, in the Appendices, formally model)
38. It also differs dramatically from what is meant by "bargaining" in the technical game-theoretic
literature. This usually supposes that the parties bargain over positive economic rents. See, e.g., Cramton,
SequentialBargaining Mechanisms, in GAME THEORETIC MODELS OFBARGAINNG 149 (A. Roth ed. 1985).
Some recent articles have explored how a competitive outcome might come about through decentralized
trade or bargaining. These tend to suppose that traders randomly meet and then engage in some form of
strategic bargaining, which is given a particular extensive form. Interestingly, it turns out that even with
frictionless trading-no time or other costs-noncompetitive equilibria can only be ruled out by assuming
that traders do not observe the offers other people exchange, but know only their own histories and whom
they can bargain with in the future. This result is established in Rubinstein & Wolinsky, Decentralized
Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome, 57 REV. ECON. STUD. 63 (1990), which contains
citations to the related literature. Thus, while it would be incorrect to say that bargaining and competition




a rule which allows all consequential damages to be recoverable, but I assume
that there is a finite limit to such damages which is known by the carrier. Thus,
what I call an "unlimited" liability default is more akin to an expansively
interpreted, open-ended "foreseeability" default rule than to a rule which
provides additionally for the recoverability of "unforeseeable" damages. There
are no "unforeseeable" damages in my model, for the reason that I am interest-
ed in comparing an expansive foreseeability default rule-the rule which
Hadley has become-to a narrow default rule like the "avoidability" rule
Hadley represents in Judge Posner's treatise.
The second item to clarify at the outset is an assumption which I shall
maintain throughout the analysis, except where it is explicitly relaxed. I assume
that the only obstacle to transacting around the default is the potential strategic
loss in revealing private information, and therefore that conventional or direct
transaction costs are minimal. This unconventional assumption is not as far-
fetched as it might seem. In all of my scenarios, bargaining around the law
means including what is essentially a short liquidated damage clause akin to
clauses in household moving contracts or the Federal Express contract which
simply varies the contract price with the extent of liability assumed by the
carrier. There may be costs in determining what price to charge for varying
amounts of liability, but these are essentially the same costs incurred in deter-
mining what price to charge given the default level of liability.
I argue here for the plausibility of this assumption simply to clarify the
difference between the kind of "cost" I am considering-strategic information
revelation-and what is usually meant by transaction cost. In any event, I will
bring these typical transaction costs back into the analysis before concluding,
because it is possible (although as I shall argue unlikely) that they would alter
the choice between competing default rules.
A. Single Price Contracts39
We consider first a model in which a carrier with some power over price
is constrained to offer a single level of coverage against shippers' consequential
loss, either unlimited, or limited by the upper bound of "foreseeable" conse-
quential loss. I will assume that the carrier's care level, and hence probability
of failing to deliver, is fixed and does not vary with the level of loss coverage
he provides. This assumption of fixed care can be justified by thinking of the
carrier as putting all shippers' goods into a single cargo hold, with a standard-
ized workforce and vessel and general method of operation leading to a stan-
39. See infra Appendix A. As with other sections in this part, the verbal argument in the main text
is supplemented by a corresponding Appendix which demonstrates the main textual assertion in a more
precise mathematical framework so that the interested reader can verify my claims. References to the
technical literature which is related to my argument in each section are also contained in the technical
appendices. This section is supplemented by Appendix A.
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dardized probability of misdelivery. Later subsections will consider the conse-
quences of relaxing all of these admittedly rather austere assumptions.
To analyze incentives to deviate from alternative legal default rules, we
need first to solve for the price that obtains under each default. To this end,
assume that bargaining is characterized by the carrier making a single take-it-or-
leave-it offer to the shipper. In such a simple bargaining game, the carrier will
choose a price to maximize his expected return. As the carrier increases the
price, the carrier must balance the decrease in the probability of acceptance and
increase in expected liability given breach against the increase in revenues.
As I have formulated it, this bargaining game is very favorable to the
carrier, who gets to make the take-it-or-leave-it offer. However, of course the
carrier's best offer in general varies with the extent of his liability for breach
if his offer is accepted and a contract is formed. When liability is unlimited
(and extends up to the maximum shipper consequential loss) the carrier will
charge a very high price, because he must take into account his expected
liability, given that the contract is accepted. The carrier's optimal price will
be much lower when the default rule specifies limited liability, because ex-
pected carrier liability given acceptance of the contract offer is much lower
under limited liability.
In analyzing the strategic incentives to bargain around these default rules,
it is important to recognize two properties possessed by the carrier's optimal,
expected profit-maximizing default price. Such a price is defined by a marginal
condition which says that the benefit from any further increase in the offer
price-the increase in net revenue if the offer is accepted-is outweighed by
the cost from a further increase in offer price-the decrease in the probability
of acceptance, multiplied by the (given) price. Because the carrier's best take-it-
or-leave-it offer is defined in this way, his offer price is inefficiently high, and
yet yields positive rents, or profits, for those shippers who accept. The price
is inefficiently high because it exceeds the carrier's costs.4 It is determined
not by the carrier's costs, but by his beliefs about how much the shipper will
be willing to pay. Nonetheless, a shipper will not accept unless she can do at
least as well by accepting than by not, and this ensures that any shipper who
accepts will earn positive rents. In particular, shippers with very high value
from the contract will earn the highest rents. Because the carrier does not know
the shipper's actual value, he cannot extract all of the value through the price
he charges.
These general points are true regardless of whether we begin from a limited
liability default or from an unlimited liability default. However, the probability
of agreement and expected carrier profit given agreement are not the same
under these alternative default rules. Therefore, the carrier's incentive to bargain
40. This assumes that the distribution of shipper values is such that some shippers have a value from
performance that exceeds the carrier's cost, so that a price in excess of cost will generally be optimal.
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around the default depends upon the default. More specifically, as explained
below, for some distributions of shipper value, there may be no incentive for
the carrier to increase his liability above the limited default, whereas there will
always be an incentive for the carrier to propose or agree that carrier liability
be reduced from an unlimited default.
Suppose first that the shipper approaches the carrier, simply tells the carrier
what his damages will be, and asks for coverage in this amount. If a simple
message of this sort is credible, however, then a high value shipper who would
have contracted under the default rule will not send the message. This is
because under either default rule, high value shippers who contract do so
because they earn positive informational rents-rents which accrue to the
shipper's private information about her actual consequential loss in the event
of breach. For a shipper who values performance highly (i.e., suffers a large
loss in the event of breach), and accepts the high-priced unlimited liability
default contract, there is obviously no incentive to reveal her value when the
default already provides for unlimited liability because she is already fully
covered. Such a shipper also has no incentive to reveal her value when the
default provides only limited liability, because if the revelation is credible and
fully informs the carrier as to the shipper's value, the carrier will extract all of
this value by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer of full coverage at a price
precisely equal to carrier value.41 Rather than earning positive informational
rents, the shipper will be forced to accept a zero rent contract. Anticipating such
a response, the high value shipper would be foolish simply to tell the carrier
what her value is.
Low value shippers, however, will generally be better off if they tell the
carrier that they have low value and want a cheaper contract. If the shipper's
value from the contract is low enough, then she will not accept the carrier's
default offer, especially when the default rule provides for unlimited carrier
liability, and induces the carrier to set a very high price.42 Because she does
not accept the default contract, such a shipper starts out earning zero rents in
the default position. If she could credibly communicate to the carrier that her
value really is low and she will not contract at the default price, then the
shipper would be no worse off and the carrier better off if they contracted
around the default. The carrier could offer a low liability, low price contract
which the low value shipper would accept.
41. A similar point has recently been made by Louis Wolcher. See Wolcher, Price Discrimination and
Inefficient Risk Allocation Under the Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 12 RES. L. & ECON. 9 (1989). Wolcher's
treatment assumes, as do I in this Section, that the carrier offers a simple single price contract under the
default (i.e., the carrier initially does not discriminate in price). His analysis basically stops at this point,
however, and he therefore does not consider the issues that I discuss in the remainder of this Part of the
Article.
42. This is true under both the unlimited and limited liability default, because as I have defined it, the
limited liability default caps damages at the level of expected damage, and therefore some shippers will
in fact suffer less damage than the average and will be unwilling to accept a contract whose price is based
on this level of liability.
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Thus, if we restrict attention only to truthful messages by shippers about
their value from contracting, it is clear that in this model, the only such messag-
es which will be effective in bargaining around the default are messages from
low value shippers, sent to get a lower liability limit than the default provides.
That is, if truthful and fully informative messages about shipper value are the
only way the parties can communicate to bargain around the default, then the
parties will not bargain around a limited liability default such as the Hadley
avoidability limitation, but will bargain around an expansive default.
It would clearly be wrong to assume, however, that bargaining around the
default requires that the shipper fully inform the carrier as to her value from
successful performance (and loss from carrier breach). The shipper might send
a less than fully informative message which is nonetheless effective in getting
the carrier to offer something other than the default contract. Or it may be that
the shipper does not have to send a message at all: the carrier may propose an
alternative to the default contract, which the shipper is free to accept or reject.
But even allowing for the possibility that the shipper sends a fuzzy message,
or that the carrier makes the proposal, the strategic obstacles to bargaining
around the limited liability default remain more serious than the obstacles to
bargaining around the unlimited liability default.
Consider the strategic incentive to bargain around limited liability. If a
carrier says that his value is so low that he cannot profitably contract given the
limited liability default price, then it must also be true that he would not
contract given a higher, unlimited liability default. Thus, if such a statement
is true given a limited liability default, then it must also be true given an
unlimited liability default. As for the position of a high value shipper, in con-
trast, it is possible that such a shipper would prefer that carrier liability be
unlimited. Such a shipper might have an incentive to send a fuzzy message
indicating that she would like to be offered an unlimited liability contract,
which the shipper might well accept if priced favorably.
But in the present model, with fixed carrier precautions and risk neutrality,
movement to the unlimited liability contract does not bring any benefit from
improved risk sharing or improved precautions. Rather, the shipper benefits
only because she pays an increased price which is less than the reduction in
her expected uncompensated loss. And the carrier benefits only because the
price increase is greater than the increase in his expected liability. The difficulty
confronting the parties in trying to bargain to such an unlimited liability
contract is informational. Shippers with the highest value will have the strongest
incentive to opt for the alternative unlimited liability contract over the original
default, limited liability contract. The carrier should realize that the default
contract has this effect, and accordingly price the unlimited liability contract
at a very high level. But the carrier's decision whether to offer such an unlimit-
ed liability contract must now be based on his expected profit from such a
contract, relative not to the alternative of no contract, but to its level of expected
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profit under the default. Any shipper who accepts the unlimited liability
alternative would accept the limited liability alternative, so by offering the
alternative, the carrier is not increasing the probability of reaching 4n agree-
ment. Therefore, for the carrier to have an incentive to offer the unlimited
liability alternative, he must be able to charge a much higher price for the
alternative than for the default contract. But high value shippers already accept
the default, and thus will not accept as high a price for unlimited liability as
they would were the "default" position no contract at all. For some distributions
of shipper value, these scissoring incentive effects of the initial, default contract
imply that there is no mutually beneficial unlimited liability alternative.
This sort of problem does not afflict bargaining around the alternative,
unlimited liability default. The contract price under this damage default rule
is very high, and because it is so high, there is a relatively low probability that
a shipper will accept. By offering a limited liability, low price alternative, the
carrier loses some expected profit on deals he would have made anyway, i.e.,
deals with shippers who would have contracted even given the high price. But
the carrier greatly increases his probability of reaching an agreement in the first
place, by offering a limited liability, lower priced alternative which will be
accepted by low value shippers who really would not have contracted at the
unlimited liability default price. Put somewhat differently, the carrier is better
off acceding to a shipper message of the sort "I won't contract unless you offer
me a low liability, low price alternative" even if he knows that the message
is not fully credible. The problem with the alternative message "I won't
contract unless you offer me an unlimited liability, high price contract"--a
message sent to induce bargaining around the limited liability default-is that
it must be false. The carrier does not increase the probability of a deal by
offering a high price, high liability alternative in addition to the low price,
limited liability default, whereas he does do so by offering a low price, limited
liability alternative in addition to the high price, unlimited liability default. For
this basic reason, there may be an incentive to bargain down from the unlimited
liability default even when there is no incentive to bargain up from a limited
liability default.
B. Extensions to the Model: Relaxing the Assumptions to Add Reality and
Robustness
The model in the previous Section is built upon a set of quite restrictive
assumptions. The narrowness of my assumptions provides an easy avenue to
criticize, and dismiss as artifactual, the results presented. To avoid these
objections, and to add relevance and increased reality to my analysis of the
information revelation problem, this Section explores the consequences of
relaxing each of the assumptions maintained thus far.
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1. Single Price Contracts with Variable Carrier Precautions and Two-
Sided Private Information43
An obvious limitation on the analysis thus far is that by assuming that
carrier precautions are fixed and do not vary with the extent of possible carrier
liability, I have failed to capture what is usually viewed as the primary efficien-
cy in a limited liability default rule: the rule's ability to force shippers to reveal
special consequential loss, which then allows carriers to take the optimal, full-
information level of precautions against breach. In this Section, I capture this
important social benefit from information transmission by assuming that the
carrier optimally adjusts the precautions against breach in light of his expected
liability. An immediate and obvious consequence of assuming optimal carrier
precautions is that both the shipper and carrier may gain by the shipper's
revelation that it has much to lose from breach and would like to contract
around a limited liability default. Such a revelation allows the carrier to take
the appropriate level of precautions, and makes it possible for the carrier to
charge a price for the high liability contract which makes both carrier and
shipper better off.
The story becomes much more complicated, and I think also more inter-
esting and realistic, if we assume both that the carrier optimally adjusts its
precautions in light of its potential liability for consequential loss, and that the
shipper does not know the actual probability of carrier breach. That is, I will
assume that the carrier knows his breach probability, but the shipper has only
a set of subjective probabilities over possible values of this probability and does
not know the true value.
With these altered assumptions, we have made strategic revelation of the
shipper's value somewhat less problematic, but created a strategic information
revelation problem for the carrier where none existed. The shipper's problem
is less acute, because as just pointed out, when the shipper reveals her private
information regarding the value of performance, she can realize a benefit from
increased carrier precautions against breach. The problem, though, is that the
size of this marginal benefit depends upon the carrier's breach probability, and
this is not precisely known by the shipper. The shipper's imperfect information
about the carrier's breach probability is likely to create a strategic obstacle to
bargaining around (up from) the limited liability default.
To see this most easily, suppose that the shipper believes that the carrier
is very efficient and reliable, and in fact thinks that there is a very low proba-
bility of breach even when carrier liability is limited (and the optimal level of
carrier precautions against breach is therefore relatively low). Since the shipper
perceives a low default probability of breach, even a shipper who will lose
unusually large profits if the carrier breaches will perceive little benefit in
43. Appendix B contains the technical supplement to this Section.
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bargaining for increased carrier liability. The extent of carrier liability affects
the shipper's payout only if the carrier breaches, and if the shipper thinks this
probability is already low-in the limited liability default position-then
increases in carrier liability will have little impact on the shipper's expected
value from the contract.
Now note that the carrier will not get the contract at all unless the shipper
perceives a positive expected value, and the carrier thus may have a natural
incentive in persuading the shipper that he is reliable and does not often breach.
But if the carrier succeeds in persuading the shipper that the default breach
probability is low, then the carrier also necessarily succeeds in persuading the
shipper that she probably does not stand to benefit much from bargaining for
an increase in carrier liability above the limited liability default. Thus, the
message which gets the carrier the default contract-a message signaling low
breach probability-will, if and only if it is believed, make the shipper suspi-
cious that the carrier's increased price for an unlimited liability contract is
merely an attempt to extract informational rents. Bargaining around limited
liability puts the carrier in a strategic dilemma: if he persuades the shipper that
the shipper will be better off with the high price, high liability alternative, then
he may also persuade the shipper that the shipper in fact is better off not
contracting with him at all, because the breach probability is too high, no matter
what the extent of carrier liability.
Note that I am arguing only that in persuading the shipper to accept the
default contract, the carrier might cause the shipper to underestimate the
probability of breach and thereby reject an efficient, high liability alternative
to the default. For this reason, my results here are consistent with the argument
made by Alan Schwartz, who argues that promisee mistakes in estimating the
promisor's breach probability affect price but not efficiency.' My results
qualify this argument: the default contract may be Pareto superior to no con-
tract, but inferior to a potential alternative which the parties will not reach
because promisee mistakes in estimating the promisor's breach probability.
The carrier does not face such a strategic dilemma in bargaining around the
unlimited liability default. A shipper will tend to prefer the cheaper limited
liability contract to the more expensive unlimited liability default if she thinks
that the carrier is unlikely to breach even given limited carrier liability. Convey-
ing such information increases rather than reduces the probability of contracting
with the shipper, and therefore is in the carrier's strategic interest.
44. See Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE LJ. 376 (1990).
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2. Two-Sided Asymmetric Information and Market Constraints on Bar-
gaining: Price as a Signal of Quality
In previous Sections, I assumed that the carrier and shipper engaged in
bilateral bargaining over the terms of their contract, and did not consider market
constraints on these terms. It may be argued that if we view bargaining as
occurring instead under the constraint imposed by a competitive carriage
market, then the strategic information revelation problems which I have stressed
will largely disappear. As shown by Ayres and Gertner, and by Bebchuck and
Shavell, however, even if the only item of private information is the shipper's
loss, competition does not completely eliminate strategic information revelation
problems. Competition forces carriers to set price equal to cost and prevents
carriers from extracting private informational rents from shippers through the
price charged, but it does not mean that a shipper has nothing to lose from
information revelation. A high value shipper under a default rule of unlimited
liability, for example, is fully covered and may have no incentive to reveal her
value, because doing so would cause the carrier to increase his price, with no
offsetting benefit to the shipper.'5
This is a problem that affects markets with one-sided private information.
In markets where both sides have private information-the carrier about his
probability of breach, and the shipper about her loss in the event of
breach-then competition is even less effective in overcoming strategic infor-
mation revelation problems. In this Section, I argue that some of the most
important strategic incentives in markets with such two-sided private informa-
tion argue for the desirability, on information revelation grounds, of the unlimit-
ed liability default.
It may be argued that markets create a natural incentive for low breach
probability carriers to identify themselves, so that competitive signaling should
eliminate the informational asymmetry on the carrier's side, and return us to
the Ayres and Gertner/Bebchuck and Shavell world in which the limited
liability default may be preferable. Because a low breach probability may
correspond to higher, more costly precautions against breach, a high quality
carrier will have a low breach probability and high costs. We might then rely
on a substantial body of recent theoretical work showing that if high quality
45. The carrier benefits from learning the shipper's actual loss because he can take the appropriate
(higher) level of precautions. Thus, the carrier could benefit from learning the shipper's actual loss even
if he kept price constant. Indeed, the carrier could offer to pay the shipper a sum equal to the decrease in
carrier expected total cost made possible by the shipper's revelation and be as well off as before, with the
shipper made better off. The problem, however, is that such an offer might also be attractive to low loss
shippers who say that they are high loss shippers just to get the bonus payment for revealing loss informa-
tion. This problem could be overcome were the shipper's stated loss subject to ex post verification. Later




corresponds to high cost, then high quality, high cost producers may profitably
separate themselves by charging a high price.4
When this analogy between a high cost, high quality goods producer and
a high cost, low breach probability carrier is pursued, however, it turns out to
support further my argument of the previous Section. Consideration of the
carrier's signaling incentives suggests that a reliable, low breach probability
carrier has a competitive advantage in offering a high liability contract to high
value shippers, and a less reliable but cheaper carrier has an advantage in
offering a limited liability package to low value shippers. I argued above that
a high breach probability under the limited liability default makes unlimited
liability more attractive to shippers. But, as I explain below, the trouble is that
the kind of carrier who can truthfully say that he has a high breach probability
under a limited liability default is the cheap, unreliable kind who will not get
the unlimited liability contract. Or, viewed somewhat differently, the reliable,
high cost carrier already signals his type under limited liability by charging a
relatively high price given limited liability. Such a carrier thus does not need
to bargain around limited liability to signal his type, and, moreover, would
never want to say that his breach probability is high, because its competitive
advantage lies in his breach probability being low.
To explain these points, assume that there are two types of carrier, as in
the previous paragraph, and two types of shipper, high value and low value,
and assume that shippers learn about carrier type only by observing the price
charged by the carrier.47 With these assumptions, expected carrier liability
under the limited liability default may be low enough so that the low breach
probability carrier has higher total expected cost. That is, the expensive, high
quality carrier is at a natural cost disadvantage when liability is limited: his pre-
cautions are unnecessarily high for this level of liability. But then with limited
liability, the high quality, low breach probability carrier can easily signal its
type by charging a high price; that is, the conditions for such signaling to occur
46. See, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, Price and Advertising as Signals of Product Quality, 94 1. PoL
ECON. 796 (1986); K. Bagwell & M. Riordan, High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality (The Center
for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, Discussion Paper
No. 808 Oct. 1988). There are other theories which explain the price-quality relationship on the basis not
of cost differentials but by the presence of some informed consumers. See, e.g., Chan & Leland, Prices and
Qualities in Markets with Costly Information, 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 499 (1982); Wolinsky, Prices as Signals
of Product Quality, 50 REv. EcON. STUD. 647 (1983). Finally, a related literature explores how the cost
of search and consumers' propensity to shop affects the distribution of price and quality under various
assumptions about market competiveness and product homogeneity. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wlide, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA.
L. REV. 1387 (1983); Schwartz & Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 REV. ECON. STUD.
251 (1985). For an overview of many of these related models and a demonstration that the presence of some
well informed consumers cannot in general eliminate price dispersion, as some stores still take advantage
of ill-informed consumers by charging high prices, see Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market,
in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZ-TION: VOLUME 1769 (R. Schmalensee & R. Wllig eds. 1989).
47. That is, shippers are uninformed and become informed only by updating their beliefs on the basis
of what they learn from the carrier's price.
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in equilibrium hold. The high quality, low breach probability carrier does not
need to bargain around the damage default rule in order to signal his type.
Suppose, by contrast, that the default rule provides unlimited liability. If
this default leads to much higher expected liability than the limited liability
default, then the high quality, high cost carrier is the more efficient carrier
under this default. This is because his relative cost advantage is greater, the
higher the level of expected liability and (optimal) precautions. Thus, such a
reliable but expensive carrier could charge a price under the unlimited liability
default which was lower than the lowest price consistent with non-negative
profits for the unreliable carrier. But then the reliable, high quality carrier
would be taking all the business under the limited liability default, and the
unreliable low quality carrier would have a strong incentive to distinguish
himself by offering a limited liability alternative, an alternative for which he
has a cost advantage and which will attract low value shippers.4 9
Thus, the unlimited liability default may force low quality, low cost carriers
to signal their type of offering under the limited liability alternative, whereas
high quality, high cost carriers naturally signal their type under the limited
liability default. Moreover, signaling incentives are actually at odds with the
information-forcing theory of limited liability. If there were only one type of
carrier, then a shipper would be more likely to prefer unlimited liability, the
higher the carrier's probability of breach. But with two types of carrier, a
carrier with a high probability of breach under the limited liability default is
precisely the sort of carrier which a high value shipper wishes to avoid. Such
a carrier would be revealing something only so that the recipient of the revela-
tion would contract with someone else, and without any need to do so, because
high quality carriers might well already charge an informative price leading to
the same sort of separation between shippers.
3. Price-Liability Menus °
Previous Sections have assumed that the carrier simply offers a single price
given the liability limit provided by the default rule. However, if a carrier has
some market power-that is, some ability to set his price according to the
shipper's value from the contract and willingness to pay-then the carrier could
generally do better than a single price contract allows. The carrier could offer
a menu of contracts, which vary by charging a different price for different
levels of carrier liability for consequential damages. Such a menu would be
designed to induce shippers to reveal their true value from the contract, and
thus extract as much value as is consistent with two constraints: first, that the
shipper be at least as well off contracting as not, and second, that the shipper
48. That is, if there axe some shippers whose damages exceed the limited liability ceiling.
49. Appendix C develops this model more rigorously.
50. Appendix D provides a technical demonstration of the points made in this Section.
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in fact reveal her true value from the contract through her choice from the
contractual menu.51
Such a menu thus is designed to induce the revelation of private infor-
mation, and therefore the more complicated form of private contract might seem
to make information revelation in bargaining around a default rule of little or
no interest. My purpose in this Section is to explain instead how strategic
problems in bargaining around the default may be severe even with these more
complicated private contracts. My argument here is, however, somewhat
different than those made in previous Sections: when the carrier offers a rent-
extracting menu of contracts, strategic behavior may preclude bargaining around
either default rule.
Note first that by offering a menu of contracts in which price varies with
the extent of its liability for consequential damages, a carrier can discriminate
among shippers, based on shippers' value from and willingness to pay for the
contract. In offering such a menu, the carrier faces the strategic problem of
getting the most out of each type of shipper. In particular, the carrier must be
concerned that a shipper with high value from the contract might choose not
the high price, high liability contract which the carrier would like to see her
choose, but instead a cheaper, less profitable contract which is intended to
attract the low value shipper. To create a disincentive for high value shippers
to defect to the cheaper contract, the carrier will in general want to degrade the
cheap contract, to offer, for example, less than full insurance against consequen-
tial loss for a low price, while at the same time offering full insurance against
consequential loss at a higher price.
If the default rule provides for unlimited liability, then it will not in any
way impede the carrier in setting the optimal menu of contracts. Assuming a
simple world of two shipper types, high value and low value, there are essen-
tially two types of cases to consider. First, if the proportion of low value
shippers is not too low, then the carrier will offer a two-contract menu: an
expensive full liability contract and an inexpensive limited liability contract.
Such a contract gives zero rents to the low value shipper, but must give positive
rents to the high value shipper, that is, the high value shipper could pay more
than the carrier charges for the full liability contract and still earn a positive
return. The high value shipper must earn positive rents, for she can always do
so by opting for the low liability/low price contract. (This follows immediately
from the fact that this contract gives the low value shipper zero rents). But then
51. These two constraints are known in the technical literature respectively as the individual rationality
constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. They are general constraints in incentive problems under
incomplete information, problems where the goal is to motivate an agent to make a choice the desirability
of which depends upon information which is known only to the agent. Generally, the need to induce the
agent to reveal his private information makes it impossible to induce the agent also to choose the action
which society (or, more generally, the principal) would prefer most given that information. For some
illustrations of these sorts of problems, see J. LAFFoNT, FUNDAMENTALS OF PUBLIc ECONOMICS (J. Bonin
& H. Bonin trans. 1988); E. RASIUSEN, supra note 5, at Part IM
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in this situation-where the carrier offers a two-contract menu giving the high
value shipper positive rents-the high value shipper would never simply reveal
her value, for the same reason given earlier: such revelation would simply
enable the carrier to offer the high value shipper only a contract which com-
pletely extracts the shipper's rents.
The other important type of case occurs when the probability of a low value
shipper is so low that the carrier is better off not offering a contract which the
low value shipper will accept. Because there is a low probability of a low value
shipper, the carrier willingly sacrifices profits on contracts with low value
shippers in order to extract all of the high value shippers' rents, some of which
could not be extracted if high value shippers had the option of opting for a
cheap, limited liability package.
If this is indeed the optimal strategy for the carrier to pursue under the
unlimited liability default, then both high value and low value shippers would
be better off with limited carrier liability. If the carrier was prohibited from
agreeing to take on more than a specified level of liability and the level of
liability was capped at less than the highest level which the carrier would offer
if unconstrained, then the carrier would be precluded from offering the
high price/high liability contract which extracts all of the high value shipper's
rent and is accepted only by the high value shipper. With this contract no
longer possible, the carrier's second best contractual strategy may call for
offering two contracts, one which is acceptable to the low value shipper, and
one which is acceptable to and yields positive rents for the high value shipper.
Both shipper types could thus be better off if a liability limit were adopted
instead of the default rule of unlimited liability. However, the carrier clearly
must be better off when offering a single, high price contract under unlimited
liability (since it was unconstrained, under unlimited liability, from offering the
two contract menu but chose the other instead). The carrier therefore will not
agree to limited liability.
By precisely the same argument, neither shipper type would accept a
movement from limited liability to unlimited liability (the high value shipper
would in particular be opposed to such a move, since she earns positive rents
under the limited liability default but zero rents under the unlimited liability
regime). The carrier would prefer such a move, but it will not be reached by
private bargaining.
Thus, in this case (which it should be stressed depends on our assumption
that the carrier prefers not to deal with low value shippers when it has unre-
stricted contractual choice), there may be an argument for limited liability, but
it is not the standard Coasean one. Rather, limited liability induces efficient
contracting, but it will not be privately agreed upon precisely because it restricts
the carrier's ability to offer a contractual menu which induces information
revelation. In this example, limited liability should be a mandatory term,
imposed on private bargainers to reduce the carrier's ability to discriminate
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among shipper types. This contrasts sharply with the Ayres and Gertner-
Bebchuck and Shavell theory, in which limited liability is the suppletory default
term, which is designed to force high value shippers to reveal their value.
III. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF EXPANSIVE DEFAULT RULES: THE THEORY
APPLIED
The previous Part of this Article developed a number of theoretical sce-
narios in which bargaining incentives tend to favor an expansive default rule.
This Part exposes my theoretical argument for expansive default rule to the fire
of (admittedly) anecdotal empirical confirmation. First, I defend against the
possibility that an insurance company, rather than the carrier, might offer to
insure the shipper against consequential losses suffered due to the carrier's
breach. Next, I argue that the anecdotal empirical evidence regarding bargaining
around the rule of Hadley as it is now applied-a rule which in fact is an
expansive default damage rule-tends to indicate that bargaining does occur,
as my model predicts. One further implication of my model is that this bargain-
ing does not show that the Hadley rule is inefficient. Finally, I argue that my
account provides an explanation and a justification for expansive default rules
which make contract doctrine consistent overall. My theoretical approach to the
Hadley rule explains how the foreseeability limitation on consequential damages
is consistent with the limited general duty to disclose prior to contracting set
forth in Laidlaw v. Organ,52 and consistent also with the hesitancy of courts
to enforce liquidated damage provisions. The information-forcing explanation
of Hadley given by Posner, Ayres and Gertner, and Bebchuck and Shavell,
however, is difficult to square with these other contract doctrines.
A. Adding the (Missing) Market: The Effect of Separate Insurance Against
Breach
It is often possible to obtain insurance against breach from someone other
than the promisor. For example, as illustrated by a recent case, it may be
possible for a shipper of household goods to agree to limit carrier liability, and
then purchase separately, say from Lloyd's of London, an insurance policy for
additional coverage against loss due to carrier nondelivery or misdelivery.5 3
If such insurance is available at competitive prices, then it might seem that the
information revelation problem I have discussed would largely disappear. Such
an insurance market could eliminate both of the informational asymmetries
which create incentives for strategic bargaining between the carrier and shipper.
52. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
53. See Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. North Am. Van Lines, 890 F.2d 1112 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding that under Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act liability limitation protected carrier
against suit by insurer as subrogee of insured's property).
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Insurers might well collect quite accurate information on a particular carrier's
breach probability, so that this would no longer be private information known
only to the carrier. Competitive insurers would then price policies based on this
knowledge of actual carrier breach probability, and the amount of coverage of-
fered. A shipper's actual consequential loss would not affect price in any
strategic sense, yet the presence of insurers as monitors of carrier breach
probabilities would provide an incentive, through the dependency of the
shipper's insurance premium amount on the identity of the carrier selected, for
carriers to take precautions to lower the breach probability.
But this is really just to say that the presence of an insurance market where
there is full information and where competitively priced insurance against
breach is sold makes the default damage rule supplied by contract law largely
irrelevant. Indeed, as a general matter, if promisees could costlessly access such
a market, then all economic analysis of contract remedies is essentially irrele-
vant.54 The default rule on damages becomes relevant, however, if we assume
that the shipper must incur a cost to become aware of and access the market
in insurance against breach. But if it is costly to buy third-party insurance
(insurance offered by someone other than the promisor) against breach, then
it is reasonable to suppose that only those shippers with a lot at stake will seek
third-party insurance, since the efficiency gain in getting third-party insurance
should in general be larger, the larger the coverage amount sought.
The preference of high value shippers for third-party insurance, however,
implies that there is no reason whatsoever to expect shippers and carriers to
bargain around a limited liability default rule. Shippers who might want to do
so would be better off purchasing third-party coverage against breach loss, even
though there is perhaps a larger transaction cost incurred in getting third party
coverage, since such coverage is not affected (by hypothesis) by the strategic
disadvantages of carrier-offered insurance. Consider, by way of contrast, the
story under the expansive default. As I argued in Part II, it is likely that
shippers and carriers will bargain around such a default. They bargain to a low
liability alternative. Thus, the expansive default gives high value shippers close
to what they want, and creates incentives for low value shippers to bargain for
what they want, with neither shipper type needing to incur the additional trans-
action costs in seeking third party coverage. The availability of competitive
third-party insurance constrains this kind of bargaining also, and in a socially
desirable way-by constraining the carrier's price rather than precluding it.
54. This is not a novel point. If parties could contract, through insurance or otherwise, against every
contingency, then contract damage remedies would be largely irrelevant. See Shavell, Damage Measures
for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466, 468 (1980).
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B. The Empiricist Claim: What Do We Learn From Federal Express?
As I said in the Introduction, Coasean Contractual Theory is a mixture of
theoretical speculation about what would be efficient for most parties, and
empirical inference regarding what most parties do. The fact that most parties
include a particular sort of contract term is, on this view, strong evidence that
the term is efficient. Conversely, the fact that most parties bargain around a
particular term is strong evidence that it is inefficient.
In a recent article, Richard Epstein has mounted precisely this sort of
empirical attack on the relatively expansive foreseeability default rule on
consequential damages: 5 He argues that the foreseeability default is inefficient
because it conflicts "with the observed limitations in express contractual
provisions that can be found today."56 Epstein observes that ordinary sales
contracts and the Federal Express shipping contract restrict liability to a level
well below the foreseeability default limit 7 But of course the liability limita-
tions we observe are written against the background of the foreseeability default
rule, and by the very nature of a default rule, we should never observe anything
but limitations differing from the default. Thus, even disregarding the informa-
tion revelation problem entirely, and adopting the simple prescription to choose
as the default that term which "most" parties want, the mere existence of devi-
ations from the default does not show that it is not efficient. This conclusion
could only be justified by looking also for cases where parties have not altered
the default, and finding that these cases are clearly outnumbered by those where
they have.
Even a cursory survey, however, reveals many reported cases in which
carriers, for example, failed to limit liability as does Federal Express5 These
cases do not constitute an unbiased survey of the universe of total cases,59 but
55. Epstein, supra note 10, at 105.
56. Id. at 125.
57. Id. at 114-22.
58. See, e.g., Starmakers Publishing Corp. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 787,791 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (in action under Carmack Amendment to Interstate Commerce Act for damages as result of late
interstate delivery of goods, Hadley default limitation applied, with the court noting how Hadley has been
"rigorously applied... in Carmack Amendment actions"); Affiliated Foods, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Marine
Management, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 838 (D.P.R. 1986) (applying Hadley limitation in action for incidental loss
under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1300 (1982) (COGSA)); Hector Martinez & Co. v.
Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 606 F.2d 106, 110 (5th Cir. 1979), cert denied 446 U.S. 982 (1980) (in
COGSA actions Hadley limitation "does not require the plaintiff to show that the actual harm suffered was
the most foreseeable of possible harms. He need only demonstrate that his harm was not so remote as to
make it unforeseeable to a reasonable man at the time of contracting.").
59. The fact that these cases went as far in the litigation process as they did may indeed be strong
indication that they involved an uncertain area of the law and issues which could not be resolved by
settlement, and are in a sense atypical. See Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos and the Torts Process: An
Economic Analysis of Legal Form 76 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1990) (constructing a theory of
ocillatory legal change which relies in part on the selection hypothesis); Priest & Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (setting out and testing this hypothesis). Moreover,
I am aware that the existence of even hundreds of cases in which the parties did not bargain around Hadley
does not prove that Hadley is efficient for most parties; my point, elaborated in the text below, is merely
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they do resemble Hadley, and occur with sufficient frequency as to cast some
doubt on the validity of Epstein's empirical claim that the foreseeability limita-
tion is not the rule which most parties in Hadley-like situations want.
Another feature of the case law which is inconsistent with Professor
Epstein's claim is the almost complete absence of reported decisions in which
the promisee claimed she told the promisor that she would suffer especially
high consequential damages. Under a restrictive, limited liability default, the
promisee must at the very least tell the promisor about such special damages
in order to hold the promisor liable for them. To recover such damages under
this default rule, the promisee must assert to the court that she made this com-
munication. It is unusual to find cases in which promisees say (truthfully or
not) that they told promisors about their otherwise unforeseeable consequential
damages. Put more simply, what the theory advanced by Posner, Ayres and
Gertner, and Bebchuck and Shavell says should happen does not seem to occur:
there simply do not seem to be any cases where the default rule forced the
promisee to reveal information about its consequential loss.
One might question the significance of this finding, however, since the
Hadley rule we actually have is an expansive foreseeability limitation and not
the theoretical avoidability limitation which Hadley itself represents in the law
and economics literature. And an expansive foreseeability default creates an
incentive to bargain down, for further limits on the promisor's liability for
consequential damages; there is no need to bargain up from such a rule. Thus
the default rule as actually applied may not be the kind of rule which really
tests the information-forcing paradigm.
Still, there are a large number of cases, particularly in the construction area,
where parties explicitly include a liquidated damage clause for nonperformance
or late performance.61 These cases represent instances where the parties have
to show the difficulty in any empirical inference regarding what most parties want.
60. For one of the very rare cases of this sort, see Ailiated Foods, 645 F. Supp. at 844, where the
plaintiff said that he told the defendant precisely what the consequences would be of failed delivery. But
in this case, the defendant allegedly replied by saying that he could not guarantee delivery at a particular
time or place, and the court viewed this as an "express rejection of certain special circumstances by one
of the contracting parties .... [W]hat we have before us is a party asking the other during the negotiation
of the contract to do something and the other answering that it could not promise such a thing." Id.
61. Contracts involving large construction projects routinely contain a clause which stipulates a per
diem deduction for delay in completing the job, and such clauses are typically enforced, even over the
owner's objection that the stipulated amount turned out to be lower than the owner's actual consequential
damages for delay. See, e.g., X.L.O. Concrete Corp. v. John T. Brady & Co., 104 A.D.2d 181,482 N.Y.S.2d
476 (1984) ($2,000 per day deduction for lateness in completing New York University Law School
dormitory project enforced over NYU's objection that amount too low). See generally Fortune Bridge Co.
v. Department of Transp., 242 Ga. 531, 250 S.E.2d 401 (1978); Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. v. N-C
Paving, 576 P.2d 455 (Wyo. 1978). Also, residential real estate contracts often contain a clause which
protects the seller from having to finance two residences by setting a particular fee per day for failure to
close the transaction by a certain date. See, e.g., Angell v. Rowlands, 85 Cal. App. 3d 536, 149 Cal. Rptr.
574 (1978). And in the same context, it is common to find that the vendor's damages in the event of
purchaser default are limited to the purchaser's down payment See Shulkin v. Dealy, 132 Misc. 2d 371,
504 N.YS.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1986). But cf. Vines v. Orchard Hills, Inc., 435 A.2d 1022 (Conn. 1980)
(allowing purchaser to recover some of the down payment on an unjust enrichment theory if the purchaser
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bargained around the uncertain foreseeability limitation, and the related limita-
tion that speculative damages cannot be recovered.62 Most of these clauses
seem intended primarily to eliminate the need for costly and uncertain litigation
to establish actual consequential loss, to replace an uncertain prospect by a
certain sum.63 With risk aversion, the certain sum will be less than the maxi-
mum foreseeable consequential loss which a court might determine and thus
such clauses generally confirm my prediction that bargaining will occur around
an expansive default. And they also suggest an additional virtue of the expan-
sive default which I have not yet addressed. An expansive default generally
increases the variance and hence the uncertainty in the damage award.64 If the
parties are risk averse, then they will generally benefit more from a certain,
liquidated damage agreement, and thereby avoid greater uncertainty. Thus by
increasing uncertainty, the expansive default acts as a "penalty" default for the
risk averse, and forces them to bargain to lower the probability of litigation.65
C. Doctrinal Consistency
As a matter of simple or naive positivism, my theory, which says that
expansive default rules should be preferred because it is easier for parties to
bargain around them, better "explains" existing doctrine, because existing
doctrine almost invariably contains an expansive foreseeability default limitation
on the recovery of consequential damages but allows parties to limit liability
below the default level.66 In my view, however, in itself this simple correspon-
dence says nothing much about the theoretical competition I have tried to stage:
it may well be that existing doctrine is inefficient.
can show that breach caused the vendor no damages or damages substantially less than the amount of the
down payment; otherwise, down payment not exceeding 10% of the purchase price is a presumptively
reasonable liquidated damage amount).
62. As noted in E. FARNswoRTHs, supra note 15, § 12.15, at 886 n.29 (1982), courts have shown an
increasing tendency to weaken the rule forbidding recovery of uncertain or speculative prospective profits.
This parallels the increasingly broad interpretation of the Hadley foreseeability limitation which Professor
Epstein has criticized.
63. For a similar explanation for why parties include liquidated damage clauses, and a criticism, based
on this explanation, of liquidated damage doctrine, see Schwartz, supra note 44.
64. For a nontechnical discussion of how increased variance relates to increased risk, see H. VARIAN,
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS Ch. 13 (1987).
65. Litigation cannot be completely avoided, however, because even though such a clause might be
mutually beneficial at the time of contracting, it would almost always be true that one of the parties dislikes
the clause when it is actually applied and would like to renegotiate it or challenge it in court, because the
amount stipulated will almost always fail to equal actual consequential damage.
66. While this is the dominant pattern in the commercial context, courts often refuse to enforce
limitations when it is the consumer who has agreed to the limitation. This is true for a variety of contracts.
See, e.g., Jones, Private Revision of Public Standards: Exculpatory Agreements in Leases, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 717 (1988). For contracts involving the sale of goods, U.C.C. § 2-715 (2) adopts the Hadley foresee-
ability limitation on recovery of consequential damages, and U.C.C. § 2-719 (3) states that "[c]onsequential
damages may be limited or excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima faie unconscionable
but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not'; see also J. WHITE & L SuMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-4, at 386-397, § 12-11, at 471-481 (1980).
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Still, as a doctrinal explanation, my theory has another virtue which the
information-forcing theory fails to possess, a virtue which does tend to support
my theory's superiority. This is the ability to provide a harmonizing theory, a
theory which makes different contract doctrines consistent with one another.
If, as Posner seems (at least at times) to maintain, common law contract
doctrine is efficient, then it should be that the information-forcing theory, which
explains why the avoidability default rule is efficient, accounts equally well for
related doctrines.
In this Section, I argue that it does not. The information-forcing theory says
that it is efficient to force promisees to reveal information about the magnitude
of their consequential loss. But such loss is, in the paradigm case, lost profit,
and other contract doctrines, exemplified most famously perhaps by Laidlaw
v. Organ,' say that the promisee has no duty to disclose the amount she
would lose if the promisor breaches. Moreover, the information-forcing theory
implies that contract law should willingly enforce liquidated damage provisions,
because it is often only through such a provision that the promisee would be
able to increase the carrier's liability, which is the point of revealing informa-
tion about consequential loss. However, contract law has traditionally been
exceptionally suspicious of liquidated damage provisions, presuming, in close
cases, that such clauses are as penalties and thus unenforceable. Finally, the
information-forcing theory is at odds with the historical background to Hadley.
As I will explain, my approach raises none of these problems.
1. Disclosure Obligations
In Laidlaw v. Organ,68 Organ purchased 111 hogshead of tobacco from
Laidlaw & Co.69 Organ made the contract with private information that the
War of 1812 had just been ended by treaty, information which eventually
caused the price of tobacco to soar above the contract price. When asked by
the Laidlaw agent "if there was any news which was calculated to enhance the
price or value of the article about to be purchased," Organ apparently was
silent. After first transferring the tobacco to Organ, Laidlaw repossessed it, and
Organ sued for damages and to prevent Laidlaw from otherwise disposing of
the tobacco.
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the trial court had incorrectly
directed a verdict finding that Organ had not committed fraud, and remanded
this issue back for consideration by the jury. But in dicta which both Judge
67. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817).
68. Id.
69. My summary of Laidlaw is drawn directly from Maser, Coleman & Heckathorn, A Bargaining




Posner and Professor Anthony Kronman7° take as the Laidlaw principle, Chief
Justice Marshall stated that Organ had no obligation to disclose information
which was "exclusively within [his] knowledge," since "[lt would be difficult
to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of
intelligence are equally accessible to both parties."'"
Broadly interpreted, such a principle would clearly conflict with the Hadley
principle that a party must disclose the magnitude of her potential loss because
she is best informed regarding it. To avoid the conflict, Posner therefore states
that the Hadley foreseeability limitation is not applied "where what is unfore-
seeable is the other party's lost profit," for the reason that "[a]ny other rule
would make it difficult for a good bargainer to collect damages unless before
the contract was signed he had made disclosures that would reduce the advan-
tage of being a good bargainer---disclosures that would prevent the buyer from
appropriating the gains from his efforts to identify a resource that would be
undervalued in its present use."'72
Judge Posner's resolution of the tension between the Hadley avoidability
principle and Laidlaw is ingenious, but unpersuasive. He recognizes that forcing
the revelation of information in the Laidlaw case would reduce the advantage
of being a good bargainer and cut the return to discovering undervalued re-
sources. But this is exactly what can occur in the Hadley situation as well.
There are differences, which the law recognizes, between lost profits as conse-
quential damages and lost profits on the deal, and we could distinguish between
Hadley and Laidlaw on this basis.73 We might, moreover, emphasize
Marshall's dictum in Laidlaw that nondisclosure is permitted74 if the matter
which might have been disclosed was "equally accessible" to both parties. That
is, the Laidlaw principle might be said to apply only where the information is
essentially public and could be discovered by either side, so-that non-disclosure
rewards the better information discoverer.75 And in Hadley, the information
might be viewed as essentially private and unavailable to the promisor.
But this public-private distinction is easy to deconstruct. Information that
a war has ended will eventually become public, but when such information was
traded on in Laidlaw it was still private, and there is nothing to indicate that
the promisor there could have found out about the treaty as quickly as did the
70. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information and the Law of Contracts, 7 . LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-18
(1978).
71. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 195. For a somewhat different economic interpretation of Laidlaw, which
focuses on the actual result in the case, see R. COOTER & T. ULEN, supra note 25, at 259-60.
72. R. POSNER, supra note 22, at 115.
73. On the distinction between consequential damages and general difference-in-value damages, see
L WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 66, § 10-4, at 386-87.
74. In fact, what Laidlaw is more conventionally understood to mean is that non-disclosure or silence
is, under certain circumstances, not fraudulent.
75. For such an explanation of Laidlaw and related cases, see K.L. SCHEPPELF, LEGAL SECRETS:
EQuALTY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW (1988).
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pronisee.76 Moreover, how does one decide what it means for information to
be "equally accessible" to both sides? If this means that the cost and expected
reward to either side from discovering the information is identical, then it must
almost always fail to hold.
Even more importantly, it is unclear why the law should reward efforts to
discover information about future market price movements with a nondisclosure
rule, but adopt a disclosure rule that penalizes promisees who have discovered
especially profitable new business opportunities. For example, in a case dis-
cussed by Professor Epstein77 performance of a shipping contract would have
allowed the shipper to construct a new sawmill in the Pacific Northwest, which
as the first mill in that location could have generated very high profits." A
severe avoidability default rule on the recovery of consequential damages would
have forced the shipper either to disclose that she had discovered such an
opportunity or else to accept great contractual risk. But it would seem that this
shipper made a much greater and more socially productive investment than did
the trader in Laidlaw, so it seems odd that the trader can remain silent while
the shipper is forced to disclose. Thus, neither the public-private distinction nor
the principle of equal access to information can harmonize Hadley and Laidlaw
with the principle of economic efficiency.
My theory, by contrast, admits that the avoidability principle and the
Laidlaw nondisclosure rule conflict. The theory defends the strategic robustness
of the rule in Hadley as it has actually been interpreted-as an expansive
foreseeability default rather than a limited avoidability default. Because this
expansive default rule does not force high value shippers to reveal their value,
it acts like a nondisclosure rule for such shippers, and it is therefore consistent
with Laidlaw.
2. Liquidated Damage Rules
According to the information-forcing theory, a limited default rule should
force high value promisees to reveal the fact that they will suffer large losses
if the promisor breaches, and they should then bargain for a higher price. In
other words, this theory says that high value promisees should bargain for
liquidated damage clauses. Note that the amounts in such clauses should
generally exceed reasonably foreseeable consequential loss, since the default
foreseeability rule already provides coverage up to this amount.
The trouble with this story is that liquidated damages doctrine makes it very
difficult to bargain for liability that exceeds what is reasonably foreseeable at
76. Scheppele in fact defends the lower court's decision in Laidlaw on the ground that the promisor
did not have equal access to the information.
77. Epstein, supra note 10, at 135.
78. British Columbia Saw-Mills v. Nettleship, 3 C.P. 499 (1868).
[Vol. 100: 615
Strategic Bargaining
the time of breach.79 It is not impossible to do so, of course, as the cases that
I cited earlier indicate.80 Yet in close cases the law says that a liquidated
damage amount that looks too high should be deemed unenforceable as a
penalty.81 This attitude is hard to square with the avoidability principle repre-
sented by Hadley, since it tends to make it very difficult for bargainers to do
precisely what the avoidability principle tells them to do.
By contrast, my theory of strategic incentives explains the law's rather
skeptical attitude toward liquidated damage clauses.82 Under an expansive
default, high value promisees are already fully covered against loss from
breach. A promisor could actually pay a bonus to a high value pronisee in
exchange for information about the size of the promisee's loss, and both would
be better off given that the promisor's ability to take the correct level of
precautions in light of the actual loss to be prevented lower her expected total
cost from the contract. The social problem is to give such a promisee an incen-
tive to reveal her value from the contract, while at the same time ensuring that
a low value type does not pretend to be a high value type just to get what
would in effect be a liquidated damage bonus above and beyond her actual loss.
One way to solve this problem is to monitor, ex post, the correspondence
between the promisee's actual damages and the liquidated damage amount, and
to refuse to enforce disproportionately large liquidated damages. With suffi-
ciently accurate monitoring, liquidated damage clauses become an
informationally feasible method for a promisee to communicate that her conse-
quential damages will be unusually high. I argued earlier that low value
promisees will generally have an incentive to bargain for less coverage than
provided by an expansive default. On my view, liquidated damage doctrine may
also make it possible for high value promisees to reveal their values, so that
there is no strategic impediment in either direction to bargaining around the
expansive default rule.
79. The courts have evolved a balancing test that makes the enforceability of liquidated damages
provisions depend primarily upon (a) whether the stipulated damage amount seems in the light of hindsight
to have been a reasonable ex ante forecast of foreseeable consequential loss, and (b) whether the actual
damages from breach are difficult to measure, and hence to recover, without a liquidated damage provision.
On this test, see generally Wassenaar v. Panos, 111 Vis. 2d 518, 529-31, 331 N.W.2d 357, 362-63 (1983);
Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 507-08 (1962).
80. See cases cited supra note 58.
81. See, e.g., Vemitron Corp. v. CF 48 Assocs., 104 A.D.2d 409, 478 N.Y.S.2d 933, 934 (App. Div.
1984); National Telecanvass Assoc. v. Smith, 98 A.D.2d 796, 470 N.Y.S.2d 22 (App. Div. 1980); Mayor
of Brunswick v. Aetna Indem. Co., 4 Ga. App. 722, 728, 62 S.E. 475, 478 (1908).
82. For other economic approaches to the liquidated damages problem, which do not make the point
I raise here, see Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages vs. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?, 1978
Wis. L. REV. 351 (1978); Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV.
554 (1977); Note, LiquidatedDamages andPenalties under the Uniform Commercial Code and the Common
Law: An Economic Analysis of Contract Damages, 72 NW. U.L. REV. 1055 (1978). For a summary of
economic arguments in favor of routine judicial enforcement of liquidated damages, see R. COOTER & T.
ULEN, supra note 25, at 293-95.
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3. Hadley's Historical Background
A final note goes to the relationship between the theoretical and historical
understanding of Hadley. Other things equal, it would seem that a theoretical
explanation ought to be consistent with the historical understanding of a
doctrine as important as the rule in Hadley. According to Richard Danzig's
pathbreaking historical account, 3 one of the things that the court sought to
accomplish in Hadley was to give carriers some kind of liability limitation, in
the face of impending parliamentary action that would have had the effect of
precluding carriers from effecting their own limitation through private con-
tract.' My theoretical account explicitly depends upon judicial enforcement
of express contractual liability limitations. If these are not enforced, then an
expansive default rule will lead carriers to charge very high prices under
unlimited liability, prices which lead to a much lower probability of contracting
than is socially optimal."5 Under these conditions, the limited liability default
rule-the actual result in Hadley-may be superior on efficiency grounds, even
if nobody bargains around the default, because it induces carriers to set a lower
price and comes closer to the socially optimal.
IV. CONCLUSION
I began this Article by expressing a belief, a belief in economics as a source
of insight into the law. As applied to the problem of crafting contract default
rules, I have tried to show that recent economic insights into bargaining and
strategic information transmission generally suggest that it will be easier for
parties to bargain around expansive default rules than around restrictive or
penalty default rules. If this is so, then the law's preference for expansive
default rules may be efficient. I say "may be" because it is possible that if
transaction costs are very high, and most parties want what they in fact get
under a penalty default, then bargaining around an expansive default involves
what is essentially needless transaction cost.
But my primary object here has not been to defend the efficiency of expan-
sive default rules. Rather, my main goal has been to show that the established
information-forcing theory of default rules fails to account adequately for
strategic incentives in bargaining around the default-to point to some serious
cracks in the theoretical foundation underlying a central case in contract law.
For if we too blithely take the foundation as solid, then what may in fact be
83. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEoAL STuD. 249
(1975).
84. Id. at 265-66.
85. For a similar, more general argument that expectation damages may be inefficient when imposed
in a market where the seller has market power and already sets too high a price, see Friedman, An Economic
Analysis of Alternative Damage Rules for Breach of Contract, 32 J.L. & EcON. 281 (1989).
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an economic-legal principle of rather limited and special validity becomes a
general truth of the common law, another confirmation of the common law's
close correspondence to principles of economic efficiency. Indeed, it is probably
possible to find some economic explanation for every important common law
doctrine, and then to construct and extend the common law based on the set
of received economic explanations. 86 Yet economic efficiency has many as-
pects and meanings which depend (among other things) upon the informational
environment supposed to exist.87 And common law doctrines are
overdetermined-they can be explained from a variety of perspectives."
"Explaining" the common law from an economic point of view can therefore
mean simply choosing a set of assumptions and notions of efficiency. My goal
here (and elsewhere) has been to expose this choice and its consequences, to
attempt to demystify the economic analysis of law.
86. I explore these themes in more detail in Johnston, supra note 1, and in a work in progress, J.
Johnston, Explaining Cases (unpublished manuscript available at Vanderbilt Law School).
87. See Holmstrom & Myerson, Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information,
51 ECONOMETRICA 1799 (1983).
88. See Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1(1984).
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APPENDIX A
This Appendix develops a simple model in which a carrier will bargain
around an unlimited liability default rule but will not bargain around the limited
liability default rule. As in the text, by "limited" liability default rule I mean
a rule which caps carrier liability at a level far below the maximum forseeable
shipper loss. By "unlimited" liability I mean a rule which makes the carrier
liable for all foreseeable shipper consequential losses.
The analysis proceeds on the basis of several assumptions. I assume that
the bargaining process is very simple, with the carrier making a single take-it-
or-leave-it offer to the shipper.' The offer is what I refer to in the text as
"single price": the carrier simply quotes a price for a single level of liability,
for example, the level provided by the default rule. I assume also that the
carrier's level of precautions against breach and hence the probability of breach
is fixed. We let q denote this probability of breach (failure to deliver), and
assume that this probability is common knowledge. Both the shipper and carrier
are assumed to be risk neutral. Let the shipper's value from successful carriage
of the good be a random variable, v, with uniform distribution on [0,P], the
actual value of which is observed only by the shipper. Similarly, let L denote
the carrier's (random) liability in the event of breach. Note that liability limita-
tions generally cause L to differ from v. Finally, to focus solely on rent extrac-
tion and creation through the bargained price, assume that the carrier's cost is
zero, and that the shipper's reservation profits are zero also.2
We solve first for the price under alternative default damage rules. The
carrier's problem is simplest under the legal default of unlimited liability, which
is favorable to shippers with high damages. In this case, (recalling our assump-
tion that v is uniformly distributed), the carrier's problem becomes:
1. At the conclusion of this Appendix, I explain how the results may be quite robust to variations in
my assumptions about the extensive form of the bargaining game. The assumption that the carrier makes
a single take-it-or-leave-it offer gives the carrier great bargaining power, but such power may exist in
bargaining even if the carrier is not a monopolist in the shipping market. For example, Perry, An Example
of Price Formation in Bilateral Situations: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information, 54
ECONOMETRICA 313 (1986), has shown that when valuations of the object to be traded are privately known
but bargaining costs are matters of common knowledge, the unique sequential equilibrum has the side with
the lower cost of waiting making an offer which the other side will either accept or reject by terminating
the bargaining-i.e., the unique sequential eqilibrium involves a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. For an
application of this result to cheap-talk games (games with messages that are not directly relevant to the
payoff), see I. Farrell & R. Gibbons, Cheap Talk, Neologisms and Bargaining (University of California,
Berkeley, Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 8883). For an application pointing out the general
inefficiency of private bargaining under incomplete information but clear property rights, see Samuelson,
A Comment on the Coase Theorem, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINNG 321 (A. Roth ed. 1985).
2. This obviously rules out the kind of efficiency gains through optimal, full-information precautions
which motivate the "information-forcing" paradigm. Below however, I explain why the problem of rent
dissipation through information revelation can prevent such gains from being realized.
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max (O -p)ma P P ((p - q) (p + )2)(Al)
This problem is derived by observing that under full liability for consequential
loss, a shipper is assured of getting her actual value v regardless of whether or
.not the contract is fulfilled, and thus contracts if and only if v >p. The carrier's
expected damages given that the shipper has accepted at price p are therefore
given by (p + 0)/2.
The first order condition for this problem defines the optimal price under
unlimited liability, P. (and also confirms that the second order condition is
satisfied) through the equation:
P. = 0/(2 - q) (A2)
Note that as typical of many bargaining models with incomplete information,
the carrier's price is not ex post efficient-many shippers whose value exceeds
the carrier's cost may fail to contract for carriage at price P,. The price falls
with the probability of breach, but always equals or exceeds the shipper's costs
(since v < 0, 0/(2 - q) > qv, where qv is the shipper's cost of providing full
coverage). Thus under unlimited liability, the carrier charges an inefficiently
high price which effectively prevents many low and moderate value shippers
from trading.
Consider next the situation under a limited liability default rule, which says
that carriers are only liable up to a ceiling which if less than the maximum
foreseeable loss. One plausible formalization of such a rule is that carrier
liability cannot exceed average foreseeable shipper loss. Under this default rule,
the carrier's expected liability, given acceptance at price p, and probability of
acceptance, are nondifferentiable at the pointp = f,, where -9 equals the expected
value of v (and hence equals 0/2 under our assumption on the distribution of
v). To solve the carrier's pricing problem, let us assume first that p > -9. This
assumption turns out to be consistent, and we can then check also that there
is no consistent solution under the assumption that p < V.
If p > V but carrier liability is capped at V, then a shipper will only accept
the contract at price p if v > V, and if:
(1 - q)v + qO - p > 0
or if
v > (p - q9)/(1 - q).
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Since only those shippers with v > -9 accept at p > -7, carrier liability is fixed
at V, and the carrier's pricing problem becomes:
max V - (p - qv)/(1 - q). (A3)
p .
The first order condition for this problem in turn implies that the price with
limited liability, P,, equals V. This solution is consistent with the assumption
underlying the problem that p > i7. To see that assuming the converse does not
yield a problem with a consistent solution, note that when p < i but liability
is capped, the carrier's expected return is equal to:
@'Op) [ P-q [ 6-n) (p+i)+Xv). 1i! 1 (A4)
v L L(i3-p) 2 (O-p)
The partial derivative of (A4) with respect to p evaluated at p = V is greater
than zero, so that (A4) does not have a consistent solution.
We thus have that under unlimited liability, the carrier's price will be:
P., = -0/(2 - q),
while he will charge P = V under limited liability.
As I argued in the text, a shipper could bargain around either default rule
by simply telling the carrier what her damages are, and asking for coverage in
this amount. If the carrier believes such a message, however, then any shipper
who would have contracted under the default rule will not send the message.
This is because under either default rule, shippers who contract earn positive
informational rents-because the carrier does not know the shipper's actual
value, he cannot extract all of this value through the price he charges. To see
how the shipper would be harmed by revealing her private information, consider
a shipper whose value exceeds V. This shipper has no incentive to reveal her
value under unlimited liability, because she is already fully covered. She also
has no incentive to reveal under limited liability, because if her revelation is
truthful, the carrier will extract all her value by offering full coverage at a price
of v, and refusing anything but this contract. The carrier will prefer this, since
under limited liability his profit selling to this particular shipper was V - q- and
would be v - qv under the new full information deal. Anticipating such a
response, the shipper would be foolish to reveal her actual value.
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There are, of course, other ways for a shipper to communicate her dissatis-
faction with the status quo liability rule than by flatly revealing her full value
from the contract. One plausible alternative is for the shipper to ask for a higher
liability limit, to request some limit L, with L > V. In general, L may be above
or below v, the shipper's actual value (loss), and so merely requesting L does
not fully reveal the shipper's value. However, as will now be shown, if the
default is limited liability, then there is no mutually agreeable increase in
liability when the carrier is aware of the information revealed by a shipper's
acceptance of such a deviation. Moreover, with information revelation, there
is no mutually agreeable liquidated liability amount (i.e., payable regardless of
actual loss) above v.
To see this, assume that a shipper with value v > i' proposes liquidated
damages in the amount L. If the price for this liquidated damage clause is p(L),
the shipper will opt for this package over the limited liability default if and only
if:
(1 - q)v + qL - p(L) > (1 - q)(v - V)
or if
p(L) < qL + (1 - q)f. (A5)
But then any liquidated damage clause which is accepted in lieu of the limited
liability default yields profits for the carrier less than:
(qL + (1 - q)V) - qL = (1 - q)9,
so that profits are lower than under the default. Hence liquidated damages
above V should not be observed.
We can now interpret L as a liability cap exceeding the liability default
value, rather than as liquidated damages. Observe first that for any shipper with
v > L, L still acts as a liquidated damage clause, and is accepted only under
condition (A5), and hence will not be agreed to by the carrier.
Any shipper with v < L is fully insured under the contract (p(L),L), and
prefers this to the default deal only if:
p(L) < qv + (1 - q)f. (A6)
But any price which satisfies (A6) lowers the carrier's profits from selling to
any type v < L who accepts (as follows immediately from (A6)). Acceptance
at price p(L) reveals that the shipper's actual value v is such that the price
increase is less than the carrier's increase in expected liability. Thus any
liability limit L exceeding v which is priced so that it would be strictly pre-
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ferred to v by some shipper type must reduce carrier's profit from contracting
with that shipper type. Since increases in liability cannot reduce the carrier's
price, they do not increase the probability of agreement, but only lower the
carrier's profit given agreement. Thus because the carrier realizes that any
shipper who accepts a high liability contract does so only because the price
increase is more than offset by the coverage increase, he realizes that any
acceptance has lowered his profit. What is good for a shipper is bad for the
carrier.
Incentives differ dramatically with proposals to contract downward from
unlimited liability. Recall that the price under unlimited liability equals
V/(2 - q), so that as q increases from zero, the price increases towards -, and
fewer and fewer shippers accept the contract under the default rule of unlimited
liability. Recall also that the price for limited liability was -9, which is invariant
with respect to q.3 If a shipper proposes a deviation from unlimited to limited
liability, the carrier may still lose profits if the shipper accepts the price charged
for lower liability, because the shipper's damages may be such that for her the
decrease in price more than offsets the reduction in coverage, but it also may
be that the shipper's value is so low that she would not have accepted the
limited liability contract. For example, if the probability of breach, q, equals
1/2, and the limited liability contract offers coverage up to V at price V, then
by making the limited liability contract available when it is requested, the
carrier loses profits on shippers with values between (4/6)f and (5/6)0, who
effectively masquerade as types who would not have purchased and opt for the
lower liability package, but the carrier gains the business of shippers with
values between (3/6)9 and (4/6)V, who really would not have purchased the full
liability contract. (Shippers whose value exceeds (5/6)V still purchase the full
liability contract). And as can be easily confirmed, carrier profits increase by
a non-negligible amount4 when the request for lower liability is met.5
Because I've utilized a very simple and quite special bargaining model in
this Appendix, a few remarks on how the results might change in a more
general model are in order. The shipper-carrier bargaining problem where the
carrier's breach probability is common knowledge but the shipper's value from
the contract is known only to the shipper is, generically, a bargaining problem
with one-sided private information which is correlated with the other side's
3. More generally, for an arbitrary default limitation L the price will equal )(1 - q)/2 + qL.
4. The increase is equal to [(1/16) - (1/36)]V.
5. Similar results can be obtained for limited liability options with even lower liability limits. If, for
example, L = 1/4 and q = 1/2, then shippers with v such that 1t2 < v < 5/6 opt for limited liability and those
with v > 516 opt for unlimited. By offering both contracts, the carrier's profit is 17/144, whereas profit is
only 12/144 with just the unlimited contract.
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value. In this problem we might imagine that what the carrier would like to do
is to make a sequence of descending offers, as he tries to get as much as
possible from the shipper. The shipper's value is also the carrier's damage
payment in the event of breach, and thus the carrier must be concerned that
while a low price increases the probability of quick agreement, it also might
be accepted by a high value (high damage) shipper who holds the carrier to an
unprofitable contract. By first offering only a very high price, and then decreas-
ing price slowly, the carrier might try to solve this problem by forcing the high
value shipper to agree early at a relatively high price rather than incur what
might be substantial costs due to delayed agreement.
Recent work,6 however, has shown that the carrier may be unable to do
this strategy. If the shipper is patient enough (has low enough delay costs) then
the sequence of descending offers may inevitably involve a net loss to the
carrier, as high value shippers simply wait. The carrier may make a single high
price take-it-or-leave-it offer. Thus while my simple model of carrier-shipper
bargaining is clearly not the best mechanism for maximizing joint surplus from
the contract, it may emerge as an equilibrium behavior even when more
complicated strategies involving a (possibly infinite) sequence of offers and
counteroffers are possible.
6. See Evans, Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values, 56 REV. ECoN. STuD. 499 (1989); D.
Vincent, Bargaining with Common Values (CMSEMS Discussion Paper No. 775, 1988, available at
Northwestern University).
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix explains some of the points made in Part II.B.1 of the main
text. That Section argued that when the carrier's breach probability is not
perfectly known by the shipper, the carrier faces conflicting strategic incentives
in bargaining around a limited liability default. This conflict can be presented
in a formal and succinct way using the same notation developed in Appendix A.
Consider a shipper whose value from the contract, v, exceeds maximum
carrier liability under the limited liability default, which as before is given by
9. Such a carrier earns non-negative returns from the limited liability contract
offered at a P, only if we have:
q- + (I - q)v - P, > 0, (A7)
where we now interpret q as the shipper's belief about the carrier's breach
probability. This belief may not be correct, and in general will be based both
on prior information about the carrier-its reputation, for instance-and specific
information conveyed by the carrier. Clearly, the left hand side in inequality
(A7) is decreasing in q for any v > f. If we think of a distribution of possible
shipper values v, then the probability that the shipper will accept the default
contract decreases as q increases, because as q becomes large, only carriers with
very high value from successful performance are able to earn non-negative
profits from the contract despite the high probability of breach. To get a high
probability that the shipper will accept the limited liability default contract,
therefore, the carrier needs to persuade the shipper that q is low. Importantly,
for any shipper with v > -9, the carrier's limited liability default breach probabil-
ity affects the shipper's return from the contract, so that the limited liability
default necessarily makes private information known only to the carrier relevant
to the shipper's decision about whether to contract.
For a shipper to prefer full coverage of all of her consequential losses, at
a (higher) price P., it must be that:
q- + (1 - q)v - P, < v - P.
or more simply,
P,, < &~ V ) + P1. (A8)
That is, the shipper must get a higher net return from the full coverage or
unlimited liability contract than from the limited liability contract. As a direct
consequence, we have from inequality (A8) that the higher is q, the breach
probability under the default, limited liability situation, the higher the price, Pu,
which the shipper will pay for the full coverage contract. But the higher is q,
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the lower is the probability that the shipper will want the default contract, so
that in order to charge a high price for the full coverage contract, the carrier
must necessarily convey information which lowers the probability of reaching
agreement on the limited liability default contract.
Consider now how things change if we begin with the full coverage default
rule. With full coverage, the carrier's breach probability is not relevant to the
shipper in computing value from the contract. Full coverage, however, induces
the carrier to charge a high price, with a low probability of agreement. For this
reason, the carrier has an incentive to communicate that his breach probability
is low, and to offer, at the same time, a limited liability default contract. This
joint communication-proposal may greatly increase the probability that the
carrier will contract (and accept the limited liability, low price alternative).
The Yale Law Journal
APPENDIX C
This Appendix sketches in more detail the signaling argument presented in
Part ll.C of the text. I say "sketch" because I do not present a formal proof
here; this will be done in another, more appropriate context. In the text, I
claimed that high quality carriers might naturally signal their type under a
limited liability default by charging a high price and that there therefore would
be no signaling incentive to bargain around the limited liability default. Con-
versely, I said that signaling might not occur under an unlimited liability
default, which would force low quality carriers to offer limited liability and
thereby signal carrier type with both price and liability coverage.
These claims can be established within the following simple, but quite
stylized model. Suppose there are two kinds of carrier, good (low breach
probability, high care level and hence cost of precautions against breach), and
bad (high breach probability, low care level and hence cost of precautions
against breach). To simplify, assume that the bad carrier takes no precautions
against breach and has therefore zero cost of precautions. Suppose also that
there are two default rules on consequential damges, limited and unlimited.
Turning now to the shipper's side, assume that there are two kinds of shipper,
low value and high value. Assume that shippers and carriers are risk neutral,
and assume that the limited liability default rule provides full coverage for low
value shippers but leaves high value shippers with uncompensated consequential
damages in the event of breach. For simplicity, assume finally that there is one
good carrier and one bad carrier, and let us embody these assumptions in the
following notation:
qj = carrier breach probability, for i = g (good), and b (bad), with q. < qb;
c = cost of precautions against breach taken by the good carrier;
v,V = shipper consequential losses (lost profit) in the event of carrier
breach, with v < V;
0 = probability that a shipper has low consequential losses, i.e., 0 =
Prob[shipper loss = v].
Consider now equilibrium in this market when the default rule provides for
limited liability, which means that carrier liability is capped at the level v.
Assume that:
qgv + c > qbv, (A9)
that is, under limited liability, the bad carrier has lower expected total cost than
the good carrier. Assume also, however, that for some price P(G) > [qsv + c],
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(1 - qg)V + qgv - P(G) > (1 - qb)V + qbv - qbv (AlO)
so that a good carrier could earn non-negative rents and still charge a price that
would attract high value shippers away from the bad carrier, even if the bad
carrier set price equal to his cost. Condition (A9) ensures that the bad carrier
can charge a price under limited liability which is so low that a good carrier
cannot mimick him and stay in business. Condition (AlO) ensures that there
are prices at which the good carrier can attract some shippers even under
limited liability.
We wish to show that there exists a stable separating equilibrium under
limited liability: an equilibrium in which carriers perfectly identify their type
through the price charged. For a notion of stablility, we use the refinement of
sequential equilibrium which Cho and Kreps have called the intuitive criterion.7
In the present context, the natural separating equilibrium under limited liability
has the good carrier charging a high price and serving the high value shippers
and the bad carrier charging a low price and serving the low value shippers.
Conditions (A9) and (AlO) ensure that many such equilibria would be stable
with respect to attempts by the good carrier to obtain the bad carrier's business
by lowering price: there exist bad carrier prices which cannot be profitably
mimicked by the good carrier. To ensure that such an equilibrium is also stable
with respect to attempted deviations by the bad carrier to obtain the good
carrier's business, we need only assume that the proportion of low value
shippers, 0, is sufficiently high. For then the bad carrier would be worse off
if he mimicked the good carrier's high price, because even if he was believed
to be a good carrier, the loss from sharing the business of low value shippers
would be greater than the gain from the higher price.
Now consider the situation under an unlimited liability default. Suppose that
we have:
qgg + c < qbV (All)
7. I imagine generally an extensive form in which carriers announce prices, shippers update their beliefs
on the basis of these prices, and then choose whether and with whom to contract. This is essentially the
same kind of extensive form, with appropriate modifications, modeled in the price-quality signaling literature,
especially K. Bagwell & M. Riordan, High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality (CMSEMS
Discussion Paper No. 808 (1988) available atNorthwestern University). The sequential equilibrium concept
due to Kreps & Wilson, Sequential Equilibria, 50 ECONOMETrCA 863 (1982), can then be applied to rule
out equilibria in such a game which essentially rely on threats (I won't contract with you unless the price
is .. ."), which are irrational to carry out when they are called, and applied also to impose the requirement
that on the equilibrium path beliefs are updated according to Bayes' Rule (and off the equilibrium path,
beliefs are consistent in that they can be derived as the limit of a sequence of beliefs formed according to
Bayes' Rule). The intuitive criterion due to Cho & Kreps, Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria, 102 QJ.
EcON. 179 (1987), then rejects as unstable those pooling equilibria in which, for example, one type of carrier
would be better off with a strategy (such as charging a price) different than the equilibrium profile and the
other type of carrier would be worse off with such a strategy even if the shipper thought he was the other
type (because if such a strategy existed the shipper would be correct in this belief).
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where i' = [Ov + (1 - 0)V]. That is, the good carrier's expected total cost from
serving both types of shipper under unlimited liability may be less than the bad
carrier's expected total cost under unlimited liability, because under unlimited
liability, the good carrier's high level of precautions is more efficient.8 If
condition (All) holds, and we continue to assume that the proportion of low
value carriers is quite high, then the good carrier would be best off-given the
default damage rule-charging a high price and mimicking the bad carrier. If
he does not do so, then he gives up profits with no corresponding gain in busi-
ness.9 The unlimited liability default leads to a pooling equilibrium which it
is to the bad carrier's advantage to break by offering limited liability as an
alternative.
8. I have simplified by assuming that carrier precautions are fixed. But the same sort of results would
obtain if we worked instead with reduced form expected total cost functions derived from a problem in
which carriers minimized expected total cost over the level of precautions, but the good and bad carriers
differed, one having low marginal cost but relatively low marginal productivity of precautions, the other
having high marginal cost but relatively high productivity of precautions.
9. The only business he could gain would be the business of high value shippers. But to get this
business he must charge a low enough price-given unlimited liability-to reveal himself as a good carrier,




This Appendix expands the analysis to consider contracts which are more
complex than those considered previously in that they involve price-liability
menus. Previous appendices assumed that the carrier simply offered a single
price given the liability limit provided by the default rule. However, a carrier
could always do at least as well, and generally do better, by offering a menu
of contracts, with each contract specifying liquidated liability L, at price pi, for
shipper of type i. Such a menu would be designed to extract as much of the
shipper's rent as possible, subject to the two constraints that the shipper agree
to contract (that the contract satisfy the shipper's individual rationality con-
straint by giving her at least her reservation profit or utility) and that the
shipper truthfully reveal her value from the contract (that the contract be
incentive compatible).
Such a menu is thus designed to discriminate in price among shippers with
differing value from the contract. The carrier's ability to effect such discrimina-
tion depends upon the presence of some power over price, and to simplify the
analysis, this Section will simply assume that the carrier is a monopolist. My
object in this Section is to demonstrate that when such a monopolistic carrier
can offer a discriminatory menu of carriage contracts, there are circumstances
under which neither the limited nor the unlimited liability default will be
bargained around. Limited liability may be preferable under these circumstances
because it forces the carrier to offer contracts which are acceptable to both low
value and high value shippers, which the carrier may not rationally do under
unlimited liability if the proportion of high value shippers is sufficiently
high.10
If shippers have linear willingness to pay for liability coverage, as in the
previous part, then there will not be a unique type-contingent menu of contracts.
To get better insight into incentives under a type-contingent menu, let us
assume that shippers are risk averse, and are identical except for the value they
place on successful performance of the carriage contract. Assume further that
there are two types of shippers-low and high value-denoted by v, and vh.
A carriage contract with price p and coverage L, yields expected utility for a
shipper with value v, of:
qu(L - p) + (1 - q&(vi - p). (A12)
Shippers are risk averse, so that u' > 0 but u" < 0. Assume for simplicity that
the carrier has zero cost and breaches with probability q, and is risk neutral.
10. The analysis in this section is similar to, but much less general than the analysis in Besanko,
Donnenfeld & White, Monopoly and Quality Distortion: Effects and Remedies, 102 QJ. ECON. 743 (1987),
who examine a model of monopolistic discriminatory price-quality menus with a continuum of consumer
types, and show how minimum quality standards and price ceilings may increase social welfare.
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The carrier thus seeks to maximize expected profit, which for any contract (Lp)
equals p - qL. If we let Fi represent the probability that a shipper has value vi,
then the carrier's problem is to find a contract which induces the shipper to
reveal her type i and maximizes expected carrier profits. When there are no
limits on L, the carrier's liability, this problem can be written succinctly as:
max F(p - qL1) + Fh(Ph - qL.) (A13)
(L,P,)
subject to:
qu(L, - pi) + (1 - q)u(v - p) > 0, for all i, (A14)
and
qu(L, - p,) + (1 - q)u(v, - p2) > qu(Lj - p) + (1 - q)u(vi - p), (A15)
for all i, j # i.
In standard fashion, the constraints (A14) and (A15) can be simplified by
observing that (A14) will bind only for the low value shipper (since any
contract yielding non-negative utility to the low value type yields non-negative
utility to the high value type, but not vice versa), and that (A15) binds for the
high value shipper.
Figure 1 depicts a possible solution of special interest." In the Figure, the
only contract offered is depicted by point A. This contract maximizes the
carrier's profit from selling to just the high value shipper. He therefore needs
to satisfy only the constraint that the high value shipper have non-negative
profit from the contract, and therefore point A lies on the high value shipper's
zero surplus indifference curve labeled Iho in the Figure. Offering only a
contract which is accepted by the high value shipper will be optimal strategy
for the monopolistic carrier if the proportion of high value shippers is high
enough. To see this, note that anytime a contract which is acceptable to the low
value shipper is also offered, the carrier must offer the high value shipper a
contract which gives the high value shipper positive rents, because the high
value shipper is always, by definition, able to get positive rent from the low
value shipper's contract. Thus, when the carrier offers two contracts-for
example, in Figure 1, contracts B (to the high value shipper) and C (to the low
value shipper)-he sacrifices some profits on contracts with high value shippers.
11. The general solution to this sort of screening problem is developed in, for example, L TIROLE, THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142-45 (1988); Cooper, On Allocative Distortions in Problems of
Self-Selection, 15 RAND L ECON. 568 (1984); Maskin & Riley, Monopoly With Incomplete Information,
15 RAND L ECON. 171 (1984).
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This sacrifice can only be worthwhile if the proportion of low value shippers
is sufficiently high, for otherwise the profits from contracts with low value
shippers will not be sufficient to offset the lost profits on contracts with high
value shippers.12
Iho [high value shipper's zero
A surplus indifference curve]
L Ih [high value shipper's positive
surplus indifference curve]
Iyo [low value shipper's zero
surplus indifference curve]
Figure 1
Somewhat more formally, the carrier will earn profits of Fh Ih,, if it offers
only contract A and serves only high value shippers. Carrier profits will be
[Fh 11h" + (1 - FD.) IlL'] fit offers both contracts B and C and serves both types
of shippers. Because Fh is high, it may well be that the carrier prefers, given
unrestricted choice, the contract A. But consider now the effect of imposing a
mandatory liability limitation, such as the cap at level L depicted in Figure 1.
12. The isoprofit lines depict the equation p = II + qL for different values of the profit I. The
indifference curves have slope qu'(L -p)lqu'(L -p) + (I - q)u'(v, - p)] > 0, and satisfy the single-crossing
or "sorting" condition since u 0 decreases in its argument.
For a similiar graphic presentation of this result in a more standard insurance context, see 1. TROLE,
supra note 11, at 162. For the general result, see Stiglitz, Monopoly, Nonlinear Pricing and Imperfect
Information: The Insurance Market, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 407 (1977).
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Because L is so much lower than the amount of coverage which the carrier
would ideally offer only to the high value shipper, contract A' brings much
lower carrier profits than contract A. Clearly if this decrease is large enough,
the carrier will be better off serving both shipper types by offering contracts
B and C (which are not prevented by the liability limit). Thus, by effectively
preventing the carrier from offering his preferred contract to just the high value
shipper, a liability limit can induce the carrier to serve both shipper types,
making both shipper types better off: the low value type is offered a zero rent
contract, which requires that the high value shipper type be offered a positive
rent contract.
For this reason, a mandatory liability ceiling can sometimes improve social
welfare. The ceiling must be made mandatory, because a low value shipper who
would otherwise be excluded from contracting under unlimited liability cannot
simply bargain around this default and ask for a low price-low coverage
contract. If the carrier offers such a contract, then he can no longer offer as
profitable a contract to the high value shipper as is possible when low value
shippers are excluded. Bargaining between low value shippers and the carrier
thus involves an externality-the high value shipper's gain when the low value
shipper is included-and is not generally efficient.
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